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L Introduction
On January 23, 1980, New Jersey, one of the leading state laboratories for
environmental regulation,' enacted a new provision of its environmental laws.
That provision allowed the state environmental agency to obtain a lien against
environmentally-contaminated property to recover funds that the state expends,
under state environmental law, to remediate any contamination.2 This lien,
however, was not ordinary; it was, rather, a "superlien," which is a lien that
enjoys priority as to other liens against the contaminated property even ifsuch
other lens predate the state's lien.' Attracted bythe prospect of increasing the
likelihood of recovering funds expended on environmental cleanups, a number
of states followed New Jersey's lead and enacted superlien statutes during the
1980s; thus, for a time it seemed that a trend was developing.4
Not everyone endorsed the superlien mechanism. The enactment of these
superlien statutes drew the ire of the mortgage lending community.5 This
1. See Barry 0. Rabe, Environmental Regulation in New Jersey: Innovations and Lim-
itations, 21 PUBuUS 83, 83 (1991) (noting that in light of New Jersey's diverse population
density, industrial diversity and concentration, and problems of environmental degradation, that
state's environmental programs consist of "unusually diverse array of programmatic innova-
tions" making New Jersey "a model for other states and the federal government"); see also
Jonathan H. Adler, Wetlands, Waterfowl, and the Menace of Mr. Wilson: Commerce Clause
Jurisprudence and the Limits of Federal Wetland Regulation, 29 ENVTL. L. 1, 45 (1999) ("Al-
lowing the states to operate as green 'laboratories of democracy' can produce both economic
and environmental gains." (footnote omitted) (quoting New State Ice Co. v. Liebmann, 285 U.S.
262, 311 (1932) (Brandeis, J., dissenting))).
2. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 58:10-23.1 1(f) (West Supp. 2000).
3. See infra note 79 for additional discussion of the definition of"superlien."
4. Early superlien statutes "seem, for the most part, to have been enacted with little fan-
fare." Margaret Murphy, The Impact of "Superfund" and Other Environmental Statutes on
Commercial Lending and InvestmentActivities, 41 BUs. LAW. 1133, 1158 (1986). See gener-
ally id. (discussing effect of environmental statutes on commercial financing transactions).
5. SeeJOELS.MoSKoWIrz,ENVIROMENTALLABU.rYADREALPROPERTYTRANSAC-
TIONS: LAW AND PRACTICE § 24.8, at 337 (2d ed. 1995) ("Mortgage lenders, particularly the
Federal National Mortgage Association . . . [,] were particularly unenthusiastic about such
statutes."); William J. Hamel, Is the Great Superlien Scare Finally Over?, 21 Env't Rep.'(BNA)
853, 853 (Aug. 31,1990) ("Lenders have.., taken the offensive in attempting to limit the spread
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animus came to a head in 1983 when, mere months after Massachusetts enacted
its own superlien statute, the Federal Home Loan Mortgage Corporation
(FHLMC or Freddie Mac),6 a corporation with ties to the federal government,
quietly, but suddenly and deliberately, suspended its purchases of apartment
and condominium mortgages in Massachusetts. The FHLMC gave the state
one month to amend the superlien statute before it would stop purchasing
single-family residence mortgages in the state.7 Another purchaser of residen-
of superlien provisions to other states, and the fruits of their labors are beginning to show."); see
also Norman R. Newman, How to CounseltheLandDeveloper on Superfind and Superliens, in
ENviRON mmrALLAwlNCoRi'oRATETRANsAcnoNs43.001,43.012 (1999)("Thesesuperliens
have created a great deal of consternation among lenders, real estate developers and investors, and
title insurance companies in those few states that have adopted this enforcement device.").
Other aspects of hazardous waste liability laws have concerned lenders over the years as
well. In particular, the subject of direct lender liability for hazardous waste site cleanups has
dogged lenders. In United States v. Fleet Factors Corp., the United States Court of Appeals for
the Eleventh Circuit held that a creditor can be liable for cleanup costs "without being an
operator, by participating in the financial management of a facility to a degree indicating a
capacity to influence the [owner's] treatment of hazardous wastes." United States v. Fleet Factors
Corp., 901 F.2d 1550, 1557 (1 1th Cir. 1990), cerL denied, 498 U.S. 1046 (1991). In response
to lenders' concern about decisions such as Fleet Factors, in 1992 the EPA issued a regulation
that interpreted CERCLA's secured creditor exemption, CERCLA § 101(20XA), (E), 42 U.S.C.
§ 9601(20XA), (E) (1994). See National Oil and Hazardous Substances Pollution Contingency
Plan; Lender Liability Under CERCLA, 57 Fed. Reg. 18,344 (Apr. 29, 1992) (codified at 40
C.F.R. § 300.1100). This rule asserts that lender "participation in the management of a facility"
means "actual participation in the management or operation of the facility... and does not
include the mere capacity or unexercised right or ability to influence facility operations." Id. at
18,375. However, the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit
declared the EPA's rule invalid as either a legislative or interpretative rule. See Kelley v. EPA,
15 F.3d 1100 (D.C. Cir. 1994) (vacating EPA's lender liability rule because courts are proper
designators of such liability under CERCLA), cerL denied, 513 U.S. 1110(1995). Subsequently,
the EPA and the Department of Justice adopted the stricken regulation "as a policy statement for
the limited purposes of government enforcement actions against lenders." MIcHAEL T. MADISON
ET AL., THE LAW OF REAL ESTATE FINANCING 13.10[2], at 13-79 (rev. ed. 1999).
In 1997, as part of the Asset Conservation, Lender Liability, and Deposit Insurance Pro-
tection Act of 1996, Congress amended CERCLA to incorporate much of the substance of the
EPA's invalidated regulation. See id. § 13.10[3], at 13-79. In effect, this enactment validated
the invalidated regulation. See id. at 13-80. In addition, many states have enacted their own
lender liability exemptions under their own superfund laws. See id. at 13-81 n.338. See gen-
erally 2 MARK E. BUDNrrZ & HELEN DAVIS CHAITMAN, THE LAW OF LENDER LIABnTY
9.02[6][c]-[e] (2000) (presenting overview of real estate finance legal issues); 1 GRANT S.
NELSON& DALEA. WHrImAN, REALESTATE FINANCE LAW §§ 4.48,4.49 (3d ed. 1993 & Supp.
2000) (same).
6. As explained below, the Federal Home Loan Mortgage Corporation is a quasi-govern-
mental corporation established, in part, to create and maintain a viable secondary mortgage
market. See infra notes 48, 50-52, and accompanying text.
7. See Laurel E. Lockett, EnvironmentalLiabilit, Enforcement and the Bankruptcy Act
of 1978: A Study of H.R 2767, the "Superlien"Provision, 19 REAL PROP. PROB. & TR. J. 859,
863 (1984) (discussing effect of proposed superlien legislation on property values); Mary T.
Koelbel, Note, The Impact of State "Superlien" Statutes on Real Estate Transactions, 5 VA. J.
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tial mortgages with ties to the federal government, the Federal National Mort-
gage Association (FNMA or Fannie Mae), also pressured Massachusetts in a
similar manmer.8
The action taken by Freddie Mac and Fannie Mae resulted in tangible con-
sequences on the housing market in Massachusetts.9 Further, the threat of a
more extensive withdrawal from the state by Freddie Mac and Fannie Mae
raised the specter of additional adverse consequences for the Massachusetts
mortgage and housing industries, as well as for homebuyers. This additional
threat convinced the Massachusetts legislature to pass an amendment within
a month that exempted "real property the greater part of which is devoted to
single or multi-family housing" from the scope of its superlien provision."0
The actions of the mortgage lending industry curtailed the expansion of
the superlien mechanism across the nation. Other states soon followed Massa-
chusetts's lead and exempted residential property from their superlien provi-
sions. Today, only two states - Louisiana and Michigan - have chosen not to
exempt residential property from their environmental superlien statutes.' Yet,
even those two states substantially circumscribe the risks to residential mort-
gage lenders. 2 Moreover, in the late 1980s the trend toward proliferation of
superlien statutes subsided.'3 Only eight states now have superlien statutes.'4
NAT. REs. L. 297, 299 (1986) (comparing effects of different state superlien statutes on similar
real estate transactions). Some commentators describe the Federal National Mortgage Associa-
tion (another corporation with ties to the federal government) as also having threatened Massa-
chusetts in this respect.
8. SeeDirectGovernmentaReview, Restriction, andProhibition ofPrivate Sector Trans-
actions and Property Transfers: Panel Discussion, 18 Envtl. L. Rep. (Envtl. L. Inst.) 10,374,
10,379 (Sept. 1988) (noting quasi-governmental entities pressuring Massachusetts (statement of
Michael P. Last)).
9. Newspapers reported that the FHLMC action resulted in about a dozen multi-family
residence projects being delayed, and another eleven being abandoned altogether. Lockett,
supra note 7, at 863; Koelbel, supra note 7, at 299.
10. See MAss. GEN. LAWS ANN. Ch. 21E, § 3 (amended 1983) (West 2001); see also
Lockett, supra note 7, at 863 (discussing changes and exemptions in Massachusetts' superlien
law); Koelbel, supra note 7, at 299 (same). Massachusetts amended its statute despite a public
statement by its governor "that he would veto any legislation gutting the state Superfund."
Lockett, supra note 7, at 863. Arkansas, too, enacted restrictions on its superlien statute in
response to pressure from the FHLMC and the FNMA. See Michael H. Schill, Lender Liability
Under CERCLA and State Superlien Statutes, C473 A.L.I.-A.B.A. 297,317-18 & n.38 (1990)
[hereinafter Schill, Lender Liability] (noting Arkansas restriction of superlien statute). Pressure
was also brought to bear in Connecticut. See Robert S. Bozarth, Environmental Liens and Tide
Insurance, 23 U. RICH. L. REV. 305, 323 (1989) (discussing additional FHLMC pressure in
Connecticut); infra notes 134-35 and accompanying text.
11. See infra notes 133-34 and accompanying text.
12. See infra notes 139-43 and accompanying text.
13. "The trend towards superliens has faltered recently. Arkansas and Tennessee deleted
superlien provisions from their cleanup statutes. In 1988, efforts to create environmental super-
liens in Kansas, New York, and Pennsylvania were defeated." Bozarth, supra note 10, at 324.
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Some states have repealed their superlien statutes,"5 and only one state has
enacted a superlien statute since the end of 1990.16
According to the prevailing wisdom, the mortgage lending industry vigor-
ously opposed state superlien statutes because superlien statutes decreased the
return lenders could expect from foreclosures on defaulted mortgage loans
and, as a result, would substantially increase the price of borrowed funds. In
this Article, I argue that this prevailing wisdom is flawed. I demonstrate the
insignificance of the immediate economic impact of superlien statutes on
residential mortgage borrowers. 17 I then explain that the real cost of superlien
statutes to lenders is the nonuniformity that they introduce between states in
the laws governing lien priority - and the possibility of future extensions of
this nonuniformity into other areas of state law governing lien priority.
The fact that the immediate economic impact of a superlien statute on
mortgage pricing remains small suggests that securitization promoters may
choose simply to price mortgages from different states without regard to the
variations in law across the states. For example, the industry responded to
nonuniformity in mortgagor protection laws across state lines in this manner.18
However, as evidenced by the experience in Massachusetts, 9 residential real
estate mortgage securitization promoters disfavored state enactments of super-
lien statutes.
I argue that the decision by the lending and securitization industries to
refuse, in the context of superlien legislation, to price mortgages without regard
In addition, at least in the early stages, states with superlien statutes other than New Jersey
did not "put [their statutes] to much use." Murphy, supra note 4, at 1159. Murphy notes that,
"[w]hile not articulated, the relative disuse of the superlien statute in any given state could . ..
reflect uncertainty as to its effect on investment activity in the state. Clearly, as bankers gain
experience with these statutes they become more vocally opposed to them." Id.
14. See infra note 78 and accompanying text (examining states currently retaining super-
lien laws).
15. See Schill, Lender Liability, supra note 10, at 316-17 ("In the past year or two, two
states that had superlien statutes, Arkansas and Tennessee, have replaced them with non-priority
liens.").
16. See David P. Farer, Transaction-Triggered Environmental Laws, Transfer Notice
Laws and Super Liens: Latest Developments § VA, in I ALI-ABA, COURSE OF STUDY
MATERALs: THE IMPACT OF ENVIRONMENTALLAWONREALESTATE AND OTHERCOMMERCIAL
TRANSACTIONS 199, at 291-94 (1999) (noting recent trends disfavoring superlien legislation);
infra note 79 (discussing different definitions of "superliens" and discussing various commenta-
tors' views as to states that have superlien statutes).
17. See infra Part VA (finding only insignificant impact of superlien statutes on resi-
dential mortgage borrowers).
18. See infra note 197 and accompanying text (discussing pricing structures of mortgage
lenders in response to state mortgagor protection laws).
19. See supra notes 5-10 and accompanying text (examining reaction in Massachusetts
to state superlien laws).
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to that risk, and instead to demand that residential mortgage liens not be subject
to superlien legislation, arises from the nature of the nomniformity in state
laws introduced by superlien statutes.20 In particular, state superlien statutes
create nonuniformity in the law in an area that has been a cornerstone of the
securitization movement - the predictability of lien preference ordering. If the
mortgage lending industry permits any nonuniformity in the laws governing
lien preference ordering, it risks relinquishing control over the future growth
and expansion of such dissimilarities. The relatively recent dramatic rise in the
practice of securitizing mortgages makes this kind of nonuniformity a serious
concern. Nonuniformity of this type may affect significantly the bundling of
mortgages from different states and result in substantial costs for mortgage
lenders and promoters. Moreover, to the extent that mortgage pools do not
transcend state lines, many of the benefits that society draws from securitiza-
tion - including lower interest rates, nationalization of real estate capital
markets, and increased cash flow into real estate capital markets - dissipate.
My analysis and conclusions are important in at least three respects. First,
they explain the actions of promoters of residential mortgage securitizations in
opposition to state environmental superlien statutes. I conclude that securitiza-
tion promoters consider state superlien statutes a substantial threat to their busi-
ness because mortgage lending practices and law in the residential arena are
especially uniform across state lines and securitization of residential mortgages
relies substantially on that uniformity. Accordingly, I predict that these pro-
moters will act to ensure that states do not broaden existing statutes or enact
new statutes whose scope would extend to residential mortgage lending.
Second, while this Article focuses primarily on residential mortgage
lending, my analysis and conclusion also apply in the context of commercial
mortgage lending. As I discuss below, securitization of commercial mortgage
loans often lags behind securitization of their residential counterparts. This
lag arises from (i) greater nonuniformity in commercial, as opposed to resi-
dential, lending and (ii) the absence of national securitization promoters in the
commercial mortgage lending and securitization arena with government ties
(such as Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac in the residential arena). Thus, state
superlien legislation finds the commercial mortgage securitization setting far
more hospitable than the residential setting. However, conditions that allow
state superlien legislation to coexist with commercial mortgage loan securiti-
zation are changing. Commercial mortgage securitization is increasing rapidly,
as is the demand for greater uniformity in commercial mortgage lending in
order to facilitate securitization. The commercial side heightens the demand
for greater uniformity because commercial loans tend to be much larger than
residential loans. As a result, commercial mortgage pools consist of fewer
20. See infra text accompanying notes 203-06 (analyzing effects of nonuniformity in state
superlien statutes).
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loans than do residential mortgage pools; thus, it is more difficult to dilute
price differentials on the commercial side. Moreover, superlien statutes prob-
ably impose greater pricing differential in the commercial setting than in the
residential setting. In light of this, it seems that opposition to superlien sta-
tutes that apply to commercial lending should increase in coming years. In
particular, pressure on states to repeal such statutes should grow.
Third, the residential mortgage lending industry's antipathy toward, and
actions taken to thwart the expansion of, state superlien statutes presents an
example of conflict between the economic needs of a particular industry's
market and society's goal of heightened environmental protection and quality.
This conflict mirrors the general discord between the desire of the lending
industry for more nationally uniform real estate laws and the local interest in
real estate laws tailored to the particular desires of residents of different
regions. This conflict differs, however, from the paradigmatic setting in
which recent academic commentary has examined the question of whether
environmental standards should be set at the national or local level. Support-
ers of federal environmental standards justify federal environmental regulation
with the argument that states might engage in a "race to the bottom" if autho-
rized to regulate the environment. In other words, commentators argue that
because market forces might sway state governments to reduce environmental
regulation, federal intervention proves justified to establish a national floor for
environmental regulation. By contrast in the case of state superlien statutes,
states that enact such statutes seek a higher level of environmental quality,
and market forces would frustrate that effort by establishing, in effect, a
national ceiling for environmental regulation.21
In Part II of this Article, I present an overview of the mortgage lending
system, including the substantial changes that the growth of securitization has
effected on that system in recent decades. In Part III, I discuss the superlien
statute. First, I describe how a superlien statute is supposed to function and
the statute's intended effect. Next, I discuss the various superlien statutes that
have been enacted in different states and highlight important differences
among them.
In Part IV, I examine the prospective benefits of superlien statutes and
the reasons that many states enacted superlien statutes in the 1980s and early
21. The superlien situation differs from the paradigmatic examination of federal, as op-
posed to state, control of environmental regulation because, in the former case, the debate is not
necessarily one that questions the sovereign in which control should be vested. In other words,
market forces have lobbied the states to dissuade them from enacting superlien statutes that apply
to residential lending; they resort to lobbying Congress to preempt state efforts in this regard.
At the same time, the lending industry has sought, successfully, Congressional help slowing the
spread of state real property laws that the lending industry felt adversely affected its business.
See infra notes 225-30 and accompanying text (discussing lending industry's superlien lobbying
efforts in state and federal contexts).
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1990s. In particular, I consider the likely effects of the enactment of a state
superlien statutes on state environmental quality and state budgeting.
In Part V of this Article, I examine the costs and general effects of super-
lien statutes on residential mortgage lenders. I describe how superlien statutes
generally affect the pre-lending practices of lenders and cause some amount
of increase in the price of borrowed funds. With that background, I then con-
sider the extent of that increase in the context of residential mortgage lending.
First, in subpart A, I examine the conventional wisdom that superlien statutes,
standing alone, substantially increase the cost of residential mortgage funds.
I consider arguments made by various commentators to this effect. Ulti-
mately, I find these arguments wanting. I then employ a net present value
model for residential mortgage cash flow to predict the actual effect that a
superlien statute may have on residential mortgage pricing. The use of this
model confirms that superlien statutes likely have a minimal impact on resi-
dential mortgage pricing.
In subpart B, I consider the impact of superlien statutes on efforts to
securitize residential mortgage loans. I argue that the real problem superlien
statutes posed to residential mortgage lenders and securitization promoters
consisted of a threat to two aspects of the industry that undergird that indus-
try's function and success: the predictability of mortgage priority laws and
the general uniformity of mortgage lending laws. First, residential mortgage
lenders generally, and securitization promoters in particular, feared that super-
lien statutes would prove to be the first chink in the armor of predictability of
mortgage priority laws. In other words, the superlien statutes might have been
the first step on a slippery slope that ultimately would eviscerate the predict-
ability that undergirds the residential mortgage lending industry. Second, resi-
dential mortgage securitization promoters feared that superlien statutes would
proliferate, leading to even more variances - and, even more troubling, vari-
ances of greater import - in state mortgage laws.
In Part VI, I consider the interplay between superlien statutes and com-
mercial mortgage lending. I observe that because of fundamental differences
between the residential and commercial mortgage markets - most notably the
absence of a federal government player (such as the FHLMC) - the lessons
about lender opposition to superlien statutes in the residential mortgage context
do not apply readily to the commercial mortgage setting. I acknowledge a
recent contribution to the academic literature suggesting that superlien statutes
may not be as promising in the commercial lending context. I then consider
whether, assuming that superlien statutes are good public policy in the com-
mercial mortgage lending context, such statutes are, and will remain, viable.
I observe that because the commercial mortgage securitization industry has
lagged far behind its residential counterpart, pressure to impose more unifor-
mity on the practices and law applicable to commercial mortgage lending has
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been comparatively less. This explains the persistence of state superlien
statutes that can apply to displace commercial mortgage security interests. I
then note that the growth of commercial mortgage securitizations, along with
the concomitant increased pressure for uniformity, likely will increase pressure
to restrict the scope of- and perhaps ultimately to repeal - superlien statutes
applying to commercial mortgages. Further, because commercial loans tend
to be much larger than residential loans, the burden that variations in local law,
caused by superlien statutes, impose on securitization promoters may be more
pronounced - and, therefore, opposition to superlien statutes may be greater -
in the commercial mortgage lending context.
In Part VII of this Article, I position the battle over state superlien
statutes in the ongoing academic debate over uniformity of law. In particular,
I focus on academic debate over the uniformity of real estate law and the
debate over the proper allocation of environmental regulatory authority
between the federal and state governments. I conclude that the superlien
dispute squares nicely with the academic debate over uniform real estate laws.
However, the superlien dispute provides a counterpoint to the traditional
setting in which environmental academics have analyzed uniformity, since
that debate has focused on whether a race-to-the-bottom on the part of states
justifies federal imposition of a uniform floor for environmental regulation.
By contrast, in the superlien context, states endeavor to enact laws that
provide comparatively greater environmental protection, while economic
pressures advocate a uniform ceiling. I reason that, even though opposition
to superlien statutes applicable to commercial real estate may increase beyond
opposition to applying statutes to residential real estate, commercial properties
remain more likely than residential properties to become environmentally
contaminated. That being the case, applying superlien statutes to commercial
real estate ensures greater environmental quality, which is the chief benefit the
statutes offer. Accordingly, in Part VIII, I conclude that the economic pres-
sures brought to bear by the expansion of securitization ought not preclude
states, as a public policy matter, from maintaining and enacting superlien
statutes that apply to commercial real estate properties.
II. Overview ofMortgage Lending
A. Background and the Primary Mortgage Market
Most individuals and families that seek to buy real property do not have
sufficient funds to finance such a purchase and thus rely on loans. Further,
many who might be able to amass the funds choose for other reasons to
finance real estate purchases using borrowed funds. Commercial entities and
businesses also often borrow money to finance real estate investments.
Persons and entities generally borrow money from professional money-
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lenders such as banks, savings and loan institutions, and mortgage bankers.'
In the terminology of the mortgage industry, the lender is called the "origina-
tor" of the mortgage.23
In general, a borrower must repay the lender the full amount of money that
he or she borrowed, plus interest thereon. The interest represents, in effect, the
"price" of the borrowed money.24 Much like any other price, the market deter-
mines the interest rate charged. In this primary mortgage market, prospective
borrowers demand loans and lenders supply them. The resultant demand and
supply curves determine the interest rates that accompany various loan struc-
tures." Figure 1 demonstrates this phenomenon, where D represents the de-
mand curve for loans and S represents the lending industry's supply curve. The
Figure predicts that there will be q loans entered into at an interest rate of i.
The price of borrowed money includes a premium for the lender.26 This
premium, in turn, includes compensation for assumption of the risk that the
borrower might default on the loan.27 Mortgage lenders mitigate this risk in
two principal ways. First, mortgage lenders take back a security interest in the
underlying real property as collateral.s If the borrower defaults on the loan,
the lender may, under local law, foreclose on the collateral to the extent of the
shortfall in the loan payments. 29 Because many mortgage loans are nonre-
22. See FRANK J. FABoZZI & CHUCK RAmSEY, COLLATERAUzED MORTGAGE OBuGA-
TIONS: STRUCTURES ANDANALYsiS 10 (3d ed. 1999) ("The three largest originators for all types
of residential mortgages are commercial banks, thrifts, and mortgage bankers, originating more
than 95% of annual mortgage originations."); Julia Patterson Forrester, Mortgaging the Amer-
ican Dream: A Critical Evaluation of the Federal Government's Promotion of Home Equity
Financing, 69 TUL. L. REV. 373,396 (1994) (noting governmental programs that promote home
equity financing).
23. FABOZZI & RAMSEY, supra note 22, at 9.
24. "Interest is the payment made for the use of money." PAUL A. SAMUELSON & WIL-
uAM D. NORDHAUS, ECONOMICS 469 (16th ed. 1998). It is "often called the 'price of money.'
Id.; see id. ("The cost of borrowing money, measured in dollars per year per dollar borrowed,
is the interest rate."); C.F. SIRMANS, REAL ESTATE FINANCE 12 (2d ed. 1989) ("[T]he price of
funds in the mortgage market ... is the interest rate.").
25. See SIRMANS, supra note 24, at 15, 17 figs. 1-4 (demonstrating effects of supply and
demand curves on interest rates and establishing interest rate as equilibrium price of loanable
funds).
26. See SIRMANS, supra note 24, at 7, 15, 17 (describing how "risk premium" contributes
to lenders adjustment of interest rates).
27. See id. at 6 (defining default risk). A lender faces, and charges a premium for, risks
other than default risk. See id. at 5-7 (describing inflation risk, business risk, liquidity risk, and
financial risk).
28. See generally Ann M. Burkhart, Lenders and Land, 64 Mo. L. REv. 249 (1999) (dis-
cussing history and evolution of mortgage lending).
29. SIRMANS, supra note 24, at 71-72 (noting methods used by mortgage lenders to assure
payment).
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course,3" foreclosure on the secured property often is the only way that mort-
gage lenders can recoup any remaining value from a loan on which the bor-
rower defaults.
Figure 1: Supply of, and demand for, mortgage loans
Price
Quantity
Mortgage lenders also mitigate the risk of default by acting as "self-in-
surers." Mortgage lenders that service a wide community of borrowers can
diversify the risk of default. 1 Further, by compiling and relying upon loss
data based on experience with a large number of borrowers, mortgage lenders
can predict with at least some accuracy the likelihood of a default based on the
characteristics of borrowers.32 They can use this data to price their mortgages
more efficiently and can rely on the law of large numbers to predict that
(absent some catastrophic risk) only an expected percentage of borrowers will
30. A loan is a nonrecourse loan if the lender has no right under the underlying note to
bring an action personally against the defaulting borrower.
31. See SMMANS, supra note 24, at 10 (discussing diversification of mortgage portfolio);
see also Paul Bennett, Portfolio Theoy and Bank Lending: Avoiding Concentrations of Credit
Risk through Strategic Diversification, 81 J. LENDnwo & CRIET RISK MGMr. 64 (1999)
(advocating that banks diversify their credit risk by considering impact of reasonable worst case
scenarios on their loan portfolios).
32. See SMMANS, supra note 24, at 11 (recounting expertise of financial institutions in
mortgage lending); see also FABOzZ & RAMSEY, supra note 22, at 10-11 (discussing lenders'
evaluation of borrowers' credit).
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default on their loans. The lender thus spreads the risk of default among all
borrowers.
Given the social benefits of loans and the lobbying power of lenders, it
is not surprising that the law assists mortgage lenders in mitigating default
risk. The law achieves this effect by allowing mortgage lenders to register
their security interests and thus generally to assure their liens a certain priority
of payment in the event of default.
Mortgage filing procedures and lien priorities generally are matters of
state statutory law. Because superlien statutes upset the status quo of lien
priority statutes, it is of particular importance that lien priority statutes come
in three basic varieties: race, notice, and race-notice statutes.33 Each breed
of mortgage filing statute leaves a mortgagee subject to different risks.34 All
these versions of lien priority statutes are similar in that these risks are quite
limited in time since no additional risk arises once the lender has recorded its
interest." In the long run, absent some intervening factor (such as the action
and effect of a superlien statute), a lender who follows proper procedure in
filing its security interest is assured of its priority of payment.
This assuredness benefits lenders and, indirectly, borrowers as well. The
virtually absolute predictability enables lenders both to avoid an increased
likelihood of loss on default and to estimate the likelihood of loss with great
accuracy. This, in turn, allows lenders to price mortgages with greater effi-
ciency and generally to minimize the loss premium that they charge, which
inures to the benefit of borrowers.
B. Securitizations and the Advent of the Secondary Mortgage Market
Subpart A presented a description of the primary markets for residen-
tial and commercial mortgages. Today, secondary markets in these mort-
gages - that is, markets in mortgages that originated in the primary mortgage
33. See GEORGE LEFCOE, REAL ESTATE TRANSACTIONS 279-80 (2d ed. 1997). Under a
race statute, the lender who records its security interest at the appropriate recorder's office first
enjoys priority over subsequent filers. Id. at 279. Under a notice statute, a lender who lends
money to a borrower after another lender takes priority over the prior lender provided that (i) the
prior lender has not yet (at the time the second lender lends the money) recorded its interest and
(ii) the subsequent lender is unaware of the prior loan. Id. Under a race-notice statute, the same
holds true, provided that, in addition, (iii) the subsequent lender records its interest before the
prior lender does. Id.
34. Under a race statute, a lender faces the risk that a subsequent lender will record its
interest first. Under a notice statute, a lender faces the risk that a subsequent lender who is
unaware of the first loan will lend money before the first lender has recorded its interest Under
a race-notice statute, a lender faces the risk that a subsequent lender who is unaware of the first
loan will lend money and record its interest before the first lender has recorded its interest. See
supra note 33 (describing race, notice, and race-notice statutes).
35. See supra note 34 (discussing risks under lien priority statutes).
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market 6 - are also well ensconced." The secondary mortgage markets have
developed and thrived as a result of the growth of securitization - namely
through issuances ofimortgage-backed securities.3" Securitization has effected
profound changes on the real estate markets over the course of the last three
decades.3 9 Real estate securitization rests on the creation and maintenance of
a secondary market for mortgage obligations. Under typical conditions, a
local lending institution generally originates a loan to a borrower in return for
a mortgage obligation, much as it would have years ago. Today, however, the
originating lending institution in all likelihood will almost immediately turn
around and resell the rights that accompany the mortgage in the secondary
market.4" In most cases, the originator will continue to service the mortgage -
36. See SnRMANS, supra note 24, at 12 (defining "secondary markets").
37. See Michael H. Schill, The Impact of the Capital Markets on Real Estate Law and
Practice, 32 J. MARSHALL L. REv. 269, 271-73 (1999) [hereinafter Schill, The Impact of the
Capital Markets] (describing effects of capital markets on real estate industry).
38. Securitization has expanded beyond its roots in mortgage-backed securities. Today,
promoters securitize various cash flows and offer securities backed by various cash-flow-gen-
erating assets. See Christopher W. Frost, Asset Securitization and Corporate Risk Allocation,
72 TUL. L. REV. 101, 104 (1997) (examining recent popularity of asset securitization).
39. Secondary markets for mortgages date back to at least the thirteenth century in Eng-
land and since the late nineteenth centuy in this country. See Burkhart, supra note 28, at 272
(tracing history of secondary markets for mortgages). However, securitization has become a
dominant force in domestic real estate markets only over the last three decades. Id. at 273-75.
The seeds that fueled the vast expansion of real estate securitization were sown during the
Depression-era administrations of Presidents Herbert Hoover and Franklin Delano Roosevelt.
For a complete description of the evolution of real estate securitizations, see Forrester, supra
note 22, at 394-96 (describing evolution of securitization); Michael H. Schill, Uniformity or
Diversity: Residential Real Estate Finance Law in the 1990s and the Implications ofChanging
Financial Markets, 64 S. CALL. REv. 1261, 1265-71 (1991) [hereinafter Schill, Uniformity or
Diversity] (same).
40. Frank Fabozzi and Chuck Ramsey explain:
Mortgage originators can either (1) hold the mortgage in their portfolio, (2) sell
the mortgage to an investor who (a) holds the mortgage in its portfolio, or
(b) places the mortgage in a pool of mortgages that will be used as collateral for
the issuance of a security, or (3) use the mortgage themselves as collateral for the
issuance of a passthrough security or a [collateralized mortgage obligation].
FABOZZI & RAMSEY, supra note 22, at 10. Michael Madison, Jeffrey Dwyer, and Steven Bender
elucidate:
Another way for mortgage originators to avoid the risk of holding loans in portfo-
lio is to sell the loans in the secondary market. Once a loan is sold, of course, the
originator no longer has to worry about the impact of future interest rate move-
ments. In exchange for protection against future losses from adverse rate move-
ments, however, the originator also gives up the prospect of profits from favorable
yield spreads. Instead, the originator must rely on loan origination fees and, in
most cases, on income from servicing the loans for the purchasers.
MADISON ET AL., supra note 5, 1 4.01[3], at 4-6.
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that is, to collect loan payments the obligation as they become due - so that
the borrower may not even be aware that the rights to the mortgage obligation
into which he or she entered have been sold.41 In reality, however, the origi-
nator serves only as a collector of funds and forwards the monies collected to
the purchaser of those rights.
Securitization promoters, or "conduits,"'42 purchase mortgages in the
secondary market. They bundle together large numbers of mortgages that they
have purchased and create "securities" based upon the underlying mortgages.
They then sell those packaged securities to investors.43
Promoters pool the mortgages they purchase and use them as collateral
to create "mortgage-backed securities."" A purchaser of a mortgage-backed
security enjoys the proceeds from, and assumes some of the risks of, the
mortgages in the underlying pool.4 The industry refers to a mortgage that is
used as part of a collateral pool in the creation of a mortgage-backed security
as "securitized."t06
41. See MADISON ET AL., supra note5, 4.02[4], at 4-11 (noting recent developments in
mortgage practices); Schill, Uniformity or Diversi, supra note 39, at 1268 n.31 (same).
42. See FABozZI & RAMSEY, supra note 22, at 10 ("Two federally sponsored credit
agencies and several private companies buy mortgages. Since these agencies and private com-
panies pool these mortgages and sell them to investors, they are called conduits." (emphasis in
original)).
43. See id. at 1-5, 9-10 (discussing sale of packaged securities in secondary markets).
44. There are two basic forms of mortgage-backed securities that securitization promoters
create and sell - passthrough securities and collateralized mortgage-backed securities (CMOs).
See id. at 1-5. A passthrough security affords investors the proceeds from the pool of mortgages
that underlies it, each pool underlies only one passthrough security. Id. at 2-3. A CMO gives
investors some priority of payment of proceeds out of the underlying pool; thus, each pool
supports more than one CMO, with some CMOs entitling their holders to payment before the
holders of other CMOs. Id. at 3-5. The motivation behind creation of CMOs as opposed to
passthrough securities is that the former, unlike the latter, distribute prepayment risk variably
among the various tranches so as to satisfy the investment needs of various holders. Id. at 2-5;
Schill, Uniformity or Diversity, supra note 39, at 1270 (noting that mortgage-backed securities
now appeal to diverse investor types); see also Schill, The Impact of the CapitalMarkets, supra
note 37, at 271 (noting that, in wake of Tax Reform Act of 1986, CMOs are structured as Real
Estate Mortgage Investment Conduits, or "REMICs").
For a discussion of the history and development of various types of mortgage-backed secu-
rities, see Jess Lederman, The Evolution of Mortgage-Backed Securities, in THE SECONDARY
MORTGAGE MARKET: STRATEGIES FOR SURVIVING AND THRIVING IN TODAY'S CHALLENGINo
MARKETS 121 (Jess Lederman ed., rev. ed. 1992) [hereinafter THE SECONDARY MORToAGE
MARKET].
45. See Schill, The Impact of the Capital Markets, supra note 37, at 271 (examining in-
vestor tolerance for risk in mortgage-backed securities).
46. FABOZZI & RAMSEY, supra note 22, at 10.
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1. Residential Mortgage Lending
Two quasi-governmental corporations - the Federal National Mortgage
Association (FNMA or Fannie Mae)4 and the FHLMC's - and one govern-
ment agency - the Government National Mortgage Association (GNMA or
Ginnie Mae)49 - have played a major role in establishing and maintaining the
secondary market for residential mortgages. The federal government estab-
lished these entities in order to "provide liquidity in the market for residential
mortgage loans and to increase the flow of capital to housing."50 Fannie Mae
and Freddie Mac act as conduits for residential mortgage-backed securities.5"
In addition, Fannie Mae, Freddie Mac, and Ginnie Mae all provide payment
guarantees for certain residential mortgage-backed securities."
Securitization has substantially affected real estate capital markets. First,
the growth of securitization has increased the amount of money in those mar-
kets, thus enlarging the funds available for real estate finance. 3 Before the
advent of real estate mortgage securitization, many investors shied away from
investing in real estate mortgages because of the relative lack of information
about those investments and the risks inherent in investing in individual mort-
47. The federal government created the FNMA in 1938. See Schill, Uniformity or
Diversity, supra note 39, at 1264 (discussing creation of FNMA). In 1968, the government
divided responsibility for FNMA's activities between two entities, the FNMA and a newly
formed government agency, the Government National Mortgage Association. The latter entity
was responsible for the low income housing subsidy programs that FNMA previously adminis-
tered. Other responsibilities remained vested in FNMA, which the government restructured into
a private corporation with ties to the federal government. See id. at 1267 (discussing FNMA's
ties to federal legislation). The President appoints five members of FNMA's fifteen-member
board of directors. Id. In 1970, Congress granted FNMA the power to buy and sell conven-
tional, as well as federally insured, mortgage loans. Id.
48. The federal government created FHLMC, a private corporation with ties to the
government in 1970, and empowered it to buy and sell conventional mortgage loans. See Schill,
Uniformity orDiversity, supra note 39, at 1267 & n.27 (noting creation of FHLMC). The Presi-
dent appoints five of FHLMC's eighteen-member board of directors. Id. at 1267 n.26.
49. GNMA was created in 1968 to assume responsibility for low income housing subsidy
programs that FNMA previously had administered. See supra note 47 (examining FNMA).
50. Schill, Uniformity or Diversity, supra note 39, at 1268.
51. FABOZZI & RAMWEY, supra note 22, at 10. They construct mortgage-backed securities
only from "conforming mortgages," which are mortgages that meet "the underwriting standards
established by these agencies for inclusion in a pool of mortgages underlying a security that they
guarantee." Id.; see SIRMANS, supra note 24, at 15. For a discussion of the evolution of
companies that act as conduits for "nonconforming mortgages," see Mark Korell, The History
and Evolution of the Mortgage Conduits, in THE SECONDARY MORTGAGE MARKET, supra note
44, at 77.
52. See FABOZZI & RAMsEY, supra note 22, at 16-17 (discussing three types of agency
"pass-throughs" and effects on mortgage guarantee); SnkMANS, supra note 24, at 15 (noting that
agencies guarantee principal and interest payments even if borrower is delinquent).
53. MADISONET AL., supra note 5, 4.01(2], at 4-4.
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gages. Securitization ameliorates both of these problems. The emergence of
a vibrant secondary real estate mortgage market, as well as a market for real
estate securitization products, dramatically increased the flow of information
relating to securitized products and the real estate mortgages that undergird
them. 4 Also, investing in securitization products allows investors to diversify
their holdings and to avoid the risk of investing in individual mortgages.
Second, the rise of securitization has led to increased nationalization of
the real estate capital markets. Prior to the advent of real estate mortgage
securitization, real estate mortgage investing was overwhelmingly local in
character. A combination of law and circumstance produced this effect. First,
federal law traditionally precluded most banking institutions from engaging
in interstate banking."s Second, the mortgage loans tended to originate lo-
cally. As such, an investor in Chicago was unlikely to be familiar with the
conditions of the real estate market in Miami or with the laws governing
mortgage lending in Florida, and time constraints often precluded an investor
from making an intelligent decision as to whether to invest in a mortgage
originating there.
Again, securitization has changed the playing field. First, investors in
real estate mortgage securitization products need not worry so much about real
estate market conditions in specific areas because the products in which they
invest in the commercial mortgage lending and securitization arena are based
upon large bundles of mortgages. Second, as discussed above, the amount of
information flow relative to real estate mortgage securitization products ex-
ceeds in amount and scope the information flow available to mortgage inves-
tors before the growth of securitization." Third, the advent of securitization
54. SIRMANS, supra note 24, at 15 (elaborating how broadening of markets has led to
easier risk comparisons between mortgage loans and other investments and how computerized
information systems have contributed to ease of access to market prices and yields).
55. The McFadden Act, 12 U.S.C. § 36(c) (2000), generally prohibited interstate banking.
Some institutions tried to evade this prohibition by constituting themselves as "bank holding
companies" that owned banking institutions in more than one state. Bevis Longstreth & Ivan
E. Mattei, OrganizationalFreedomforBanks: The Case in Support, 97 COLUM. L. REV. 1895,
1898 (1997). See generally Stacey Stritzel, Note, The Riegle-Neal Interstate Banking and
Branching Efflciency Act of 1994: Progress Toward a New Era in Financial Services Regula-
tion, 46 SYRACUSE L. REV. 161, 169-73 (1995) (discussing restrictions on interstate banking).
With the Riegle-Neal Interstate Banking and Branching Efficiency Act of 1994, Congress
largely eliminated the McFadden Act's prohibition. Longstreth & Mattei, supra, at 1898; David
A. Skeel, Jr., The Law and Finance of Bank and Insurance Insolvency Regulation, 76 TEX. L.
REV. 723,770 n.172 (1998).
56. See Schill, Uniformity or Diversity, supra note 39, at 1298 ("[C]entralized sources
of information about state mortgage law help minimize transaction costs. Several law firms
across the nation specialize in mortgage foreclosures and have experience in all fifty states. In
addition, detailed summaries and comparisons of state real estate finance laws are widely
available." (footnote omitted)).
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gave rise to great pressure on real estate practitioners and legislators to begin
to eliminate some of the differences in local real estate practice and law that
once might have made investors reticent about investing in real estate mort-
gages in regions of the country with which they were unfamiliar.5 7 This
nationalization of the real estate capital markets allowed capital available for
real estate investment to flow from richer to poorer areas of the country.8
These features - the increase in money invested in real estate capital
markets and the nationalization of the real estate capital market - reflect a
more general phenomenon wrought largely by the growth of securitization:
the integration of real estate capital markets with general capital markets. In
general, this integration increased the flow of capital into the real estate
markets.59 In particular, this integration has reduced home mortgage loan
interest rates.'
2. Commercial Mortgage Lending
The development of a secondary market for commercial mortgages lags
behind the robust growth of the secondary market for residential mortgages.61
Four factors conspire against, and have slowed the development of, a second-
ary market for commercial mortgages. First, Fannie Mac, Freddie Mac, and
Ginnie Mae neither generate, nor provide guarantees for, securities backed by
57. See SIRMANS, supra note 24, at 15 (detailing changes brought by nationalizing mort-
gage markets); Schill, The Impact of the Capital Markets, supra note 37, at 284 ("[Wlith respect
to mortgages on single family homes, most lawyers have typically given up trying to get
originators to accept provisions that vary from the Fannie Mac or Freddie Mac forms because
such provisions would make the loans unsaleable in the secondary mortgage market.").
58. See MADISON ET AL.,supra note 5, 4.01[1], at 4-3 (discussing nationwide flow of
real estate capital); SIRMANS, supra note 24, at 15-16 ("Federal credit agencies... help create
a national market for existing mortgages to .. .shift funds from capital-rich to capital-poor
areas."); Burkhart, supra note 28, at 280 (examining real estate capital flow); Schill, Uniformity
or Diversity, supra note 39, at 1269 (same).
59. See Schill, Uniformity or Diversity, supra note 39, at 1271-72 (noting 29% increase
in secondary mortgage markets from 1970 to 1984).
60. See id. at 1272-73 (noting study estimating reduction as between fifteen and thirty
basis points); see also A. Michael Froomkin, Reinventing the Government Corporation, 1995
U. IL. L. REV. 543, 600 ("[S]tudies suggest that the existence of Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac
in the secondary [mortgage] market ultimately lowers mortgage rates by up to 50 basis points."
(footnote omitted)). A basis point equaled 1/100th of an interest rate percentage point. Schill,
Uniformity or Diversity, supra note 39, at 1272 n.51.
61. See Georgette C. Poindexter, Subordinated Rolling Equity: Ana ing Real Estate
Loan Default in the Era of Securitization, 50 EMORY L.J. 519, 523-30 (2001) (discussing col-
lapse of commercial whole loan market and origins of commercial secondary market); Schill,
The Impact of the Capital Markets, supra note 37, at 273-74 ("As the securitization of home
mortgage loans exploded in the 1980s, the commercial mortgage debt market was much slower
to join the securitization bandwagon.").
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commercial mortgages.62 Indeed, no governmental or quasi-governmental
agency or corporation serves to create and maintain a secondary market for
commercial mortgages.63
Second, the terms of commercial mortgages vary far more greatly than do
those of residential mortgages.' The terms of residential mortgages are fairly
standard on a national basis and generally vary only as to their terms and
prices."' Commercial mortgages, by contrast, exhibit distinctions that are far
more numerous and greater in scope."6 Moreover, the absence of a national
corporation with government ties has influenced the shape of the secondary
market in commercial mortgages and on the underlying commercial mortgages
themselves. In particular, there is less pressure to bring uniformity to the terms
of commercial mortgages between states or even within regions.67 This lack of
pressure to conform terms tends to preserve the broad variations in commercial
lending.
Third, "[c]ommercial loans tend to be much larger than residential
loans."' s As a result, a pool of commercial mortgages likely contains far
fewer mortgages than a comparably valued pool of residential mortgages.
This means that commercial-mortgage pools offer less opportunity for diversi-
fication of risk and make securities based upon such pools less attractive to
investors.69
62. See Schill, The Impact of the CapitalMarkets, supra note 37, at 273 ("[N]o secondary
mortgage market for commercial mortgage loans was created by the federal government.").
63. See id. at 274; see also Froomkin, supra note 60, at 600. However, the federal gov-
ernment, through the Resolution Trust Corporation, has issued commercial mortgage-backed
securities. Although the volume of such issues does not approach the volume of residential
securitizations in which Fannie Mae, Freddie Mac, and Ginnie Mac are involved, the impact has
promoted a uniform secondary commercial mortgage market structure. See infra notes 219-21
and accompanying text.
64. See Burkhart, supra note 28, at 276 ("[C]ommercial properties and loans are less
uniform than residential properties and loans.").
65. See supra note 57 (noting rigidity in residential mortgage terms).
66. See Schill, The Impact of the CapitalMarkets, supra note 37, at 274. Schill states the
following:
Commercial mortgages loans are... more idiosyncratic than residential loans. Com-
mercial properties are typically quite different from each other, requiring much more
due diligence than pools based upon relatively similar single family loans. Moreover,
the loan documentation for commercial properties tends to be much more voluminous
and non-uniform as compared to residential properties.
Id.
67. See id. ("[Without a secondary mortgage market backed by federal or quasi-federal
guarantees, the commercial mortgage-backed securities market required experimentation with
different methods of credit enhancement such as letters of credit and overcollateralization.").
68. ld. at 273.
69. See id. at 273-74.
ENVIRONAENTAL SUPERUENS
Fourth, before the economic downturn of the late 1980s and early 1990s,
commercial borrowers could readily obtain mortgage loans; they "enjoyed
access to a deep capital pool with relaxed underwriting criteria.""° Until the
1990s, there was simply no strong pressure for the infusion of funds into, and
the nationalization of, the commercial real estate market.
Despite these obstacles, a thriving secondary commercial mortgage mar-
ket has arisen in recent years." Still, commercial mortgage securitizations lag
far behind securitizations of residential mortgages."
III. Overview of Environmental Superlien Statutes
A. The Superlien Statute
Federal and state hazardous waste cleanup statutes typically include
provisions that give rise to a lien in favor of the jurisdiction's environmental
agency as to property that the agency has expended monies to clean. The
federal Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability
Act of 1980 (CERCLA) 3 includes a provision that confers upon the United
States Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) a lien against property to the
extent that the EPA expends funds in cleaning up the property (a CERCLA
lien).74 The CERCLA lien is a "standard lien"; that is, the priority of the lien
70. Poindexter, supra note 61, at 524.
71. See, e.g., id. at 530-32 (noting that issuances of commercial mortgage-backed secu-
rities rose from $3 billion in 1990 to $78 billion in 1998); Schill, The Impact of the Capital
Markets, supra note 37, at 274 (noting that volume of commercial mortgage securitizations rose
850% from 1991 to 1997); id. at 274-76 (discussing same).
72. See Schill, The Impact of the Capital Markets, supra note 37, at 274 ("As compared
to residential mortgages, commercial mortgage-backed securities have a way to go.").
73. Pub. L. No. 96-510,94 Stat. 2767 (1980) (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 9601-
9675 (1994 & Supp. III 1997)).
74. CERCIA § 107(1),42 U.S.C. § 9607() (1994), provides, in pertinent part:
(1) In general
All costs and damages for which a person liable to the United States under [this
statute (with an exception not relevant here)] shall constitute a lien in favor of
the United States upon all real property and rights to such property which -
(A) belong to such person; and
(B) are subject to or affected by a removal or remedial action.
(2) Duration
The lien imposed by this subsection shall arise at the later ofthe following:
(A) The time costs are first incurred by the United States with respect to a
response action under this act.
(B) The time that the person referred to in paragraph (1) is provided (by
cerified or registered mail) written notice of potential liability.
Such lien shall continue until the liability for the costs (or a judgment
against the person arising out of such liability) is satisfied or becomes
unenforceable ....
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is determined under traditionally applicable rules of lien priority." Thus, a
CERCLA lien will be superior to liens held by unsecured creditors and those
filed subsequently76 but will remain inferior to pre-existing liens. Many state
laws mimic CERCLA in this respect and also confer standard liens to state
environmental agencies under analogous circumstances."
By contrast, Connecticut, Louisiana, Maine, Massachusetts, Michigan,
New Hampshire, New Jersey, and Wisconsin provide state environmental
agencies with liens of a special, higher priority, called "superliens," for recov-
ering clean-up expenditures.78  These superliens give state environmental
(3) Notice and validity
The lien imposed by this subsection shall be subject to the rights of any pur-
chaser, holder of a security interest, or judgment lien creditor whose interest is
perfected under applicable State law before notice of the lien has been filed in
the appropriate office within the State (or county or other governmental subdi-
vision), as designated by State law, in which the real property subject to the lien
is located. Any such purchaser, holder of a security interest, or judgment lien
creditor shall be afforded the same protections against the lien imposed by this
subsection as are afforded under State law against a judgment lien which arises
out of an unsecured obligation and which arises as of the time of the filing of
the notice of the lien imposed by this subsection.
This provision was added in 1986 by the Superfund Amendments and Reauthorization Act, Pub.
L. No. 99-499, 100 Stat. 1613 (1986).
75. 2 BUDsTZ & CHAIrrMAN, supra note 5, 9.05, at 9-69. There were unsuccessful
efforts to cast the CERCLA lien as a superlien. See MADISON ET AL., supra note 5, 13.10, at
13-63; Lockett, supra note 7, at 865 (discussing congressional consideration of superlien
provision); John Andrew Maher & Kathryn C. Hoefer, Note, Federal Superlien: An Alternative
to Lender Liability Under CERCLA, 6 ST. JOHN'S J. LEGAL COMMENT. 41, 57 n.92 (1990).
76. The precise nuances of priority will depend upon whether the state has adopted a race,
notice, or race-notice recording priority statute. See CERCLA § 107(l)(3), 42 U.S.C.
§ 9607()(3) (1994) ("[The government lien] shall be subject to the rights or any purchaser,
holder of security interest, or judgment creditor whose interest is perfected under applicable state
law.... ."); see also supra notes 33-35 and accompanying texts (discussing lien priority statutes).
77. See, e.g., ALASKA STAT. § 46.08.075 (2000). A list of nonpriority lien statutes is
found in Farer, supra note 16, § V.B, at 295-98. See also KATHRYN R. HEIDT, ENVIRONMENTAL
OBLIGATIONS IN BANKRUPTCY 7.07 (1993) (examining several states' statutes).
78. CONN. REV. STAT. ANN. § 22a-452a (West Supp. 2001); LA. REV. STAT. ANN.
§ 30:2281 (West 2000); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 38, § 1371 (West 2001); MASS. GEN. LAWS
ANN. ch. 21E, § 13 (West Supp. 2000); MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 324.20138 (West 1999);
N.H. REv. STAT. ANN. § 147-B:10-b (Supp. 2001); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 58-10-23.11 (ft) (West
Supp. 2001); WIS. STAT. ANN. § 292.81(3), (4) (West 1999). These states are identified as
having superlien statutes in a study of state hazardous waste cleanup statutes prepared by the
Environmental Law Institute. See ENVTL. LAW INST., AN ANALYSIS OF STATE SUPERFUND
PROGRAMS: 50-STATE STUDY, 1998 UPDATE § I[I.H, at 38 (1998) [hereinafter ELI SUPERFUND
REPORT]. I rely upon the ELI Superfund Report in light of the fact that, in the report's prepara-
tion, ELI personnel followed a comprehensive methodology, including interviews with state
environmental department staff members and independent verification of responses to interview
questions. See id. § I, at 2.
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Some commentators consider states in addition to the eight listed in the text to have super-
lien statutes. Kathryn Heidt divides state superlien statutes into two categories: those that give
rise to fully retroactive superpriority, and those that give rise to superpriority only as to liens filed
after the effective date of the statute. See HEIDT, supra note 77, 1 7.05[1], 7.06[1]. Only
Connecticut and Maine fall into the latter category. Id. 11 7.06[2], [3]. Heidt places Alabama,
Massachusetts, Michigan, Minnesota, New Hampshire, New Jersey, Pennsylvania, Wisconsin,
and Wyoming in the former category. Id. 1 7.05[IA] to [7] (1993 & Supp. 1999). For purposes
of the analysis in this Article, I choose not to consider Alabama, Minnesota, Pennsylvania, and
Wyoming among the states that have "true" superlien statutes because these states' statutes do
not provide generally for state superliens whenever the state expends money for an environmental
cleanup. Alabama's statute applies only to fees the state charges operators of hazardous waste
disposal facilities for each ton of hazardous waste they dispose, see id. 7.05[IA] (citing ALA.
CODE § 22-30B-9 (1997)); Minnesota's statute applies only to cleanups of landfills, see id.
7.05[2B] (citing MINN. STAT. ANN. § 115B.41(2) (Supp. 1995)); Pennsylvania's statute applies
only to funds incurred to abate past mining practices at a site, see id. 7.05[5] (citing 32 PENN.
STAT. § 5116(aX) (1996)); and, similarly, Wyoming's statute applies only to costs incurred to
reclaim mining sites, see id. 7.05[71 (citing WYO. STAT. § 292.82(1) (Supp. 1996)).
David Farer lists the eight states that I have mentioned as having superlien statutes and
includes Illinois. See Farer, supra note 16, § V.A.2, at 302 (citing 65 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/11-
31-1(e), (f) (1999)). The Illinois statute allows municipalities and private parties to obtain a
superpriority lien to cover their cleanup expenditures. See 65 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/11-31-1
(1999). That provision has no exemption for residential property. The Illinois superpriority
lien is superior to all liens except tax liens. See id. 5/11-31-1(a). I do not include it as a
superlien statute because it does not create a superpriority lien in favor of the state or a state
agency.
Joel Moskowitz considers seven states in his discussion of superliens. As compared to my
list of eight states, he omits Michigan and Wisconsin but includes Texas. See MOSKOWrTZ,
supra note 5, §§ 7.8-7.14. Under Texas law, a state lien to recover environmental cleanup
expenses enjoys priority as to previously-filed liens only if "the person acquiring the mortgage,
lien, or other encumbrance on the property had or reasonably should have had actual notice or
knowledge that the real property is subject to or affected by a cleanup action or has knowledge
that the state has incurred cleanup costs." TEx. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE ANN. § 361.194(g)
(1992). Thus, as Moskowitz explains:
The lien imposed by Texas law follows the normal rule of precedence unless the
holder of a prior interest had actual or constructive notice of the remedial action
that allowed the state's lien at the time of acquisition. In such an event, the state's
lien becomes a superlien as to that earlier filer.
MOSKowrrZ, supra note 5, § 7.14, at 93 (emphasis in original). He opines that the statutory
reference "to a person who 'reasonably should have had actual notice' . . . suggests that some
sort of reasonable due diligence is necessary to preserve the priority of a lien or other interest
in real property." Id. I do not consider Texas as having a superlien statute for purposes of
the analysis in this paper because the standard in Texas is to follow "the normal rule of prece-
dence." Id.
Norman Newman lists six states as having adopted superlien statutes. Of the eight I list
in the text, he omits Louisiana, Maine, Michigan, and Wisconsin, but includes Arkansas and
Tennessee. See Newman, supra note 5, at 43.012, 43.021 app. D. Although Arkansas and
Tennessee were among the earliest states to enact superlien statutes, neither state currently
maintains a broadly applicable superlien statute. See ELI SUPERFUND REPORT, supra, § fI.H,
at 38 ("Arkansas had one of the early superlien authorities, but it is no longer listed in this study
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agencies liens that are superior to all (or most) other liens regardless of when
the competing liens were obtained or perfected.79
The underlying motive for these superlien statutes is manifest. Absent
such a statute, the traditional rules of lien priority would allow a state to ex-
pend funds to clean up a contaminated property, with some or all of the benefit
from those expenditures inuring to the senior secured lenders. These lenders
would see the value of their security interests increase by virtue of the increase
in property value resulting from the cleanup. If a state cannot recover its
cleanup expenditures from the contaminating parties, it would be left to pursue
any remaining equity in the property and other unencumbered assets of the
property owner to recoup its expenses. Because environmental cleanup costs
are generally quite large and the property owner is probably insolvent, the
as having such authority because of constraints placed on the authority by the legislature
rendering it largely inapplicable in most instances."); Schill, Lender Liability, supra note 10,
at 316-17 (noting that Arkansas and Tennessee have replaced superlien statutes with non-prior-
ity liens).
In addition to the foregoing, at least one municipality - New York City - has enacted
legislation that affords its agencies superliens in certain circumstances. The city's superlien
statute applies broadly and is not specifically designed to recoup environmental cleanup costs.
See Marvin N. Bagweil, The New York City Superlien: WhatlsltAnyway?, 13 N.Y. REAL EST.
L. REP. 10 (1999) (noting coverage for expenditure "to correct any condition that is dangerous
to human life and safety or detrimental to health.").
79. Different commentators offer generally similar definitions of "superliens." See 2
BuDNrrz & CHArrMAN, supra note 5, 9.05, at 9-69 (stating that superliens "give priority
to claims for environmental cleanup expenses over other claims against a business"); ELI
SuPERFuND REPORT, supra note 78, § II.H, at 38 ("Superliens differ from ordinary liens in
that they claim a higher priority than they would ordinarily obtain under the laws governing
security interests .... A superlien changes [ordinary] priority by giving the State's lien for
recovery of cleanup costs priority over some or all liens even if they have been recorded
earlier."); HErDT, supra note 77, 7.05[1], at 7-13 ("A superlien law creates a lien that takes
priority over all other liens on the property, including existing liens."); 6A WILLIAM L.
NORTON, JR., NORTON BANKRUPTCY LAW AN PRACTIcE 2d § 149:21,at 149-70 (2000) ("The
liens are referred to as 'superliens' because they take priority over all other liens, including
previously existing recorded liens." (footnote omitted)); Burkhart, supra note 28, at 299 ("[A]
mortgage will be subordinated to the environmental 'superlien' even if the mortgage was
recorded before the environmental problem existed."); Hamel, supra note 5, at 853 ("The term
'superien' has been used to define a first priority lien: one that take precedence over prior
perfected liens."); Newman, supra note 5, at 43.011 to 43.012 ("A superlien is... a lien that
takes priority over all other liens, including those that are prior in time and already perfected.");
Koelbel, supra note 7, at 298 (stating that under a "superlien," "any expenditures made pursu-
ant to the statute constitute a first priority lien upon the real property of the hazardous waste
discharger").
Still, somewhat surprisingly (given what seems to be a fairly straightforward concept),
some commentators assert that "there is some room for interpretation as to what constitutes a
superlien." DANML P. SELMI & KENNETH A. MONASTER, STATE ENVIRONMENTAL LAW
§ 9.04[2][a], at 9-55 (1995). This contention perhaps is borne out by different commentators'
classification of different states as having enacted superlien statutes. See supra note 78.
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state, under these circumstances, will probably not recover much, if any, of its
expenditures.9
°
A superlien statute changes this result. It gives a state the highest priority
as to the post-cleanup equity in the property. This prioritization scheme greatly
increases the chances that a state will recoup its cleanup expenditures."'
Because superlien statutes can give a state's lien priority over other
lenders' liens even though the state's lien arose and was perfected later, these
statutes are subject to various constitutional challenges. 2 First, one can argue
that the state procedures for obtaining and exercising a superlien deprives
superior lienholders of property without the due process of law that is required
by the Fourteenth Amendment."3 Indeed, the United States Court of Appeals
for the First Circuit held in 1991 that the EPA had violated the Fifth Amend-
ment's Due Process Clause when it obtained a CERCLA lien - of conven-
tional priority - without affording the property owners notice of the lien and
allowing for a predeprivation hearing. 4 In fact, as I discuss below, several
state superlien statutes do require the state to provide notice of the new lien
to preexisting lienholders.83
Second, one can argue that use of a superlien statute to supersede a pre-
existing lienholder's property interest is an unconstitutional state government
80. See ELI SUPERFUND REPORT, supra note 78, § M.H, at 38 ("The rationale for the
superlien is that if the State had not expended the money, the property would have been worth-
less; therefore, the State should recoup its expenses before any others benefit.").
81. A more extensive discussion of the likely benefits and costs associated with a super-
lien statute appears infra in Parts IV and V.
Three economists argue that in the context of commercial financing superlien statutes may
result, perversely, in states footing more of the bill for environmental cleanups and would be
detrimental to public welfare. See infra notes 207-13 and accompanying text. Their arguments
seem facially inapplicable to the context of superliens as applicable to residential mortgage
lending. This is so because the incentives for residential and commercial borrowers are differ-
ent. In particular, prospective residential borrowers generally do not strongly consider whether
or not the borrowed money will be invested profitably.
82. Although the statutes are subject to challenge, there is only one reported court de-
cision that addresses constitutional challenges to a state superlien statute. (As discussed below,
Kessler v. Tarrtrs, 476 A-2d 326 (N.J. Super. App. Div. 1984), addressed both Takings Clause
and Contracts challenges to New Jersey's statute.) This may be a function of the relative
desuetude - at least early on - of superlien statutes (other than New Jersey's). See supra note
13 (discussing recent superlien trends).
83. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV.
84. Reardon v. United States, 947 F.2d 1509, 1523 (1st Cir. 1991). See Cheryl Kessler
Clark, Due Process and the Environmental Lien: The Need for Legislative Reform, 20 B.C.
ENVTL. AFF. L. REV. 203, 229 (1993) ("Without provisions for pre-attachment notice and
hearing, the superlien statutes are unconstitutional." (footnote omitted)).
85. See infra note 97 and accompanying text (noting state superlien statutes that require
state to give actual notice to property owners or lienholders).
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taking of property without just compensation. 6 Michael Madison, Jeffrey
Dwyer, and Steven Bender argue for a distinction between superlien sta-
tutes that afford the state's lien superpriority status only as to liens perfected
after the effective date of the statute - such as those in Connecticut and
Maine - and those superlien statutes that apply retroactively. They assert that
purely prospective applications of superlien statutes would not seem to violate
the Constitution, insofar as persons and entities obtaining liens after that date
have notice that a subsequent state environmental lien may take priority over
their liens.' Madison, Dwyer, and Bender further argue that even retroactive
applications of superlien statutes do not effect an unconstitutional taking
without just compensation, because either (i) the cleaned-up property may
well have been valueless before the cleanup so that no compensation was due,
or (ii) the cleanup of the property adds to its value, and thus constitutes the
due compensation.88
Perhaps the most constitutionally challenging superlien statutes are those
that allow the state's lien to take priority over liens that cover pieces of prop-
erty other than the contaminated property that are held by the same owner.8 9
However, in Kessler v. Tarrats,' the only reported court decision analyzing
a Takings Clause challenge to a superlien statute, a New Jersey appellate court
upheld that state's superlien statute.9' The court reasoned:
The illegal dischargers are responsible for the physical damage to the
property and any corresponding diminution in marketvalue thereof. What-
86. Compensation for state government takings of property are required by the Fifth
Amendment, as applied to the states by the Fourteenth Amendment. U.S. CONST. amends. V,
XIV; see generally MADISON ET AL., supra note 5, 7.08[2]. In particular, purely prospective
applications of superliens statutes (i.e., applications of the pertinent statutes to give the state's
lien priority over a lien perfected after the effective date of the statute) would not seem to violate
the Constitution, insofar as persons and entities that obtain liens after that date have notice that
a subsequent environmental lien obtained by the state may take priority over their liens. See
MADISONET AL., supra note 5, 7.0812][a]. Further, one can argue that applications of superlien
statutes to liens covering the property that was the subject of the cleanup do not effect an uncon-
stitutional taking without just compensation, insofar as either (i) the property well may have been
valueless before the cleanup so that no compensation was due, or (ii) the actual cleanup of the
property adds to the value of the property, and thus constitutes the due compensation. See id.
7.0812][b][i]. The most constitutionally problematic instance of a superlien statute is where
the statute allows for the state's lien to take priority over liens covering pieces of property other
than the contaminated property held by the same owner. See id. 7.08[2][b][ii]. However, a
New Jersey appellate court upheld that state's superlien statute, which applies in such situations,
against such a challenge. See Kessler v. Tarrats, 476 A.2d 326,326 (N.J. Super. App. Div. 1984).
87. See MADISONET AL., supra note 5, 7.08[2][a].
88. See id. 7.0812][b][i].
89. See id. 7.08[2][b][ii].
90. 476 *2d 326 (N.J. Super. App. Div. 1984).
91. Kessler v. Tarrats, 476 A.2d 326, 332 (N.J. Super. App. Div. 1984).
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ever diminution in value may have occurred to affect plaintiff's security
interest was as the result of the acts of polluting the property. Therefore,
whatever property, if any, was "taken" was taken by the dischargers of the
hazardous substances and not by the State.
92
Last, one can argue that the application of superlien laws violates the
Constitution's Contracts Clause.93 In Kessler, the only reported court decision
addressing a Contracts Clause challenge to a state superlien statute, the appel-
late court rejected this argument against New Jersey's superlien statute on the
ground that the adoption and use of the statute was a valid exercise of the
state's police power.94
B. Variations in State Superlien Statutes
The contours of superlien statutes vary from state to state.95 Table 1 sum-
marizes important variations in state superlien statutes. First, the procedural
path by which a state's environmental lien acquires superpriority status differs
among statutes. Generally, all statutes require that the state file its lien.'
Some statutes further require that the state give actual notice to property
owners and, in some instances, to lienholders. 7
92. Id. But cf. In re Heldor Indus, Inc., 131 B.R. 578, 586 (Bankr. D.N.J. 1991) ("[I]t
would violate the Takings Clause of the Fifth Amendment to hold that [New Jersey's Environ-
mental Cleanup Responsibility Act] cleanup costs take priority over security interests in person-
al property."), aff'd, 139 B.R. 290 (D.N.J. 1992), vacated on other grounds sub noma. New
Jersey Dep't of Envtl. Prot. & Energy v. Heldor Indus., Inc., 989 F.2d 702 (3d Cir. 1993). The
Heldor bankruptcy court specifically noted that the relationship between the holding of the court
in Kessler and "the issue of whether liens on real property can be primed under [the Environ-
mental Cleanup Responsibility Act] is beyond the scope of this case." Id. at 586 n.7.
93. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 10, cl. 1.
94. Kessler, 476 A.2d at 330-31.
95. See, e.g., David G. Butterworth, Comment State SuperfundSuperliens: WhoDo They
Lean On?, 1 VILL. ENVTL. L.J. 163, 178-82 (1990) (discussing operation of state superlien
statutes); Douglas C. Ballantine, Note, Recovering Costs for Cleaning Up Hazardous Waste
Sites: An Examination ofState Superlien Statutes, 63 IND. L.J. 571,581-85 (1988) (same); Beth
Anne Smith, Comment, State "Superlien "Statutes: An Attempt to Resolve the ConflictBetween
the Bankruptcy Code and Environmental Law, 59 TEMPIE L.Q. 981,1006-10 (1986) (same).
96. See 2 BUDNrrz & CHArrMAN, supra note 5, 1 9.05, at 9-64 ("All of the superlien
statutes require that a notice of lien be appropriately filed."). One might think that, insofar as
a superlien statute will likely come into play where the property owner is in bankruptcy, the
Bankruptcy Code's "automatic stay" provision, see 11 U.S.C. § 362(a), would in many cases
interfere with the ability of a state to file its lien and thus obtain a superlien. However, courts
have held that the state's action in filing a superlien falls within an exception to the automatic
stay. See 229 Main St Ltd. P'ship v. Mass. (In re 229 Main St. Ltd. P'ship), 251 B.R. 186
(Bankr. D. Mass. 2000) (holding that Massachusetts superlien did not violate automatic stay);
In re Microfab, Inc., 105 B.R. 152 (Bankr. D. Mass. 1989) (same).
97. As reflected in Table 1, these states are Connecticut, Maine, and Wisconsin.
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Table 1 - Summary of State Superlien Provisions
State and Statute Connecticut Louisiana
Are there any prereq- (1) Notice of intent to file a Notice of lien must be
uisites to the states' lien must be sent to recorded filed.'0 '
lien acquiring mortgagees and lienhold-
superpriority status? crs;" (2) a certificate of lien
must be filed;" and (3) a
copy of the certificate must
be mailed to the owner and
all persons of record with an
interest in the property.'o
Is the statute wholly No; superlien trumps only Yes.
retroactive? those liens recorded after
June 3, 19 8 5 .101
Is there a residential Yes; superlien does not No.
property exemption? apply to "real estate which
consists exclusively of resi-
dential real estate."
o3
Does the statute extend No.' M  No.
superpriority beyond
the property that has
been cleaned up?
Does the statute extend Yes. No; superpriority applies
superpriority to the only to the post-cleanup
full value of the prop- value of the property in
erty? excess of the property's
pre-cleanup value. 05
98. CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 22a-452a(cXl) (West Supp. 2001).
99. Id. § 22a-452a(bXl).
100. Id. § 22a-452a(bX2).
101. LA. REv. STAT. ANN. § 30:2281 (West 2000).
102. CoNN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 22a-452a(f) (West Supp. 2001).
103. Id. § 22a-452a(f); see id. § 22a-452a(g) (allowing state only ordinary lien as to resi-
dential property).
104. However, the superlien extends to "real estate which has been included, within the
preceding three years, in the property description of such real estate and is contiguous to such
real estate." Id. § 22a-452a(f).
105. However, the superlien extends to "all real estate of a responsible party that has been
included in the property description of the affected real estate within the 3-year period preceding
the date of filing of the lien or on or after July 7, 1987, whichever period is shorter." LA. REV.
STAT. ANN. § 1371(2XA) (West 2000).
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State and Statute Maine Massachusetts
Are there any prereq- (1) Certificate of lien must "[A] statement of claim"
uisites to the states' be mailed to all persons of naming persons liable un-
lien acquiring record who have an interest der state law must be "re-
superpriority status? in the property that the corded, registered or
state's lien will trunp;"°6  filed." '1r
and (2) lien must be filed."07
Is the statute wholly No; superlien trumps only Yes.
retroactive? those liens recorded after
July 7, 1987.09
Is there a residential Yes; superlien does not Yes; superlien does not
property exemption? apply to "a unit of real es- apply to "real property the
tate that consists primarily great part of which is de-
of real estate used or under voted to single or multi-
construction as single or family housing."'
multi-family housing at the
time the lien is
recorded .... ,, o
Does the statute extend No.12  No.
superpriority beyond
the property that has
been cleaned up?
Does the statute extend Yes. Yes.
superpriority to the
full value of the prop-
erty?
106. ME.REv. STAT. ANN. tit. 38, § 1371(3) (West 2001).
107. Id. § 1371(4).
108. MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 21E, § 13 (West Supp. 2000).
109. MW. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 38, § 1371(2XA) (West 2001).
110. Id. § 1371(5).
111. MAsS. GEN. LAws ANN. ch. 2 1E, § 13 (West Supp. 2000).
112. However, the superlien extends to "all real estate of a responsible party that has been
included in the property description of the affected real estate within the 3-year period preceding
the date of filing of the lien or on or after July 7, 1987, whichever period is shorter." ME. REv.
STAT. ANN. tit. 38, § 1371(2XA) (West 2001).
59 WASH. &LEE L. REV 127 (2002)
State and Statute Michigan New Jersey
Are there any pre- For a superlien equal to cleanup costs Notice of lien must
requisites to the to the extent that cleanup increases be filed.1
7
states' lien acquir- value of property,"3 lien must be per-
ing superpriority fected by filing." 4 For amounts be-
status? yond that, lien must be perfected by
filing,'"5 and attorney general may
petition to make state's lien a super-
lien if a regular lien "is insufficient to
protect the general interest of the
state in recovering response costs."" 6
Is the statute wholly Yes. Yes.
retroactive?
Is there a residen- No. Yes; superlien does
tial property not apply if the
exemption? property comprises
six dwelling units or
less and is used ex-
clusively for resi-
dential purposes.""
Does the statute ex- No. No.
tend superpriority
beyond the prop-
erty that has been
cleaned up?
Does the statute Perhaps; for superlien in excess of Yes.
extend super- the extent to which the cleanup in-
priority to the full creases the value of the property, the
value of the prop- attorney general must file, and a court
erty? must approve, a petition. "9
113. See MICH. CoMP. LAWS ANN. § 324.20138(4) (West 1999) (stating that state can
obtain lien to extent that state response activity increased value of property).
114. Id. § 324.20138(5).
115. Id.
116. Id. § 324.20138(2).
117. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 58:10-23.1 If(f) (West Supp. 2001).
118. Id. § 147-B:10-b(IIl(a); see id. § 147-B:10-b(IXc) (stating that liens on residential
properties become effective at time and date of filing "without priority on antecedent encum-
brances of record").
119. MIcH. CoM. LAWSANN. § 324.20138(2); see supra text accompanying notes 100-02
(discussing Michigan requirement that attorney general must petition court for superlien in
excess of amount by which cleanup increases value of property).
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State and Statute New Hampshire Wisconsin
Are there any prerequi- To be valid against real (1) Notice of lien must
sites to the states' lien property, notice of lien must be given to owner of
acquiring superpriority be filed with property re- property;'2 and lien
status? cords."' To be valid must be filed with the
against business revenues register of deeds in the
and personal property, no- proper county.'23
tice of lien must be filed




Is the statute wholly ret- Yes. Yes.
roactive?
Is there a residential Yes; superlien does not Yes; superlien does not
property exemption? apply to "real property in apply if the property is
use as, or being constructed residential property."" 5
primarily for, residential
purposes.''2
Does the statute extend Yes; superlien extends to No.
superpriority beyond the "business revenues gener-
property that has been ated from the facility on
cleaned up? which hazardous waste or
hazardous materials is lo-
cated and personal property
located at the facility on
which hazardous waste or
hazardous material is lo-
cated."
126
Does the statute extend Yes. Yes.
superpriority to the full
value of the property?
120. N.H. REv. STAT. ANN. § 147-B:10-b(I) (Supp. 2001).
121. Id. § 147-B:10-b(HI)(b).
122. Wis. STAT. ANN. § 292.81(4) (West 1999).
123. Id. § 292.81(3).
124. N.H. REv. STAT. ANN. § 147-B:10-b(III)(a) (Supp. 2001); see id. § 147-B:10-b(IIl)(c)
(stating that liens on residential properties become effective at time and date of filing "without
priority on antecedent encumbrances of record").
125. WIs. STAT. ANN. § 292.81(4) (West 1999).
126. N.H. REv. STAT. ANN. § 147-B:10-b(m)(b) (Supp. 2001).
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Michigan's superlien statute is unique in that it creates two superliens and
imposes different prerequisites for each. The first lien, in an amount equal to
the lesser of (i) the state's cleanup expenses and (ii) the increased value of the
cleaned property,'2" acquires superpriority status as soon as the state files, and
thus perfects the lien (the Michigan automatic superlien provision)." For lien
amounts in excess of the increase in the property's value resulting from the
cleanup, the state still must file the lien. 29 In order to achieve superpriority,
however, the state attorney general must petition a court and assert that a lien
of ordinary priority would be "insufficient to protect the interest of the state in
recovering response costs" (the Michigan discretionary superlien provision).1
30
A Michigan appellate court has held that the trial court hearing the petition has
discretion to grant or deny the attorney general's request.'
3 1
The state superlien statutes of Connecticut and Maine grant state cleanup
liens superpriority status only over competing liens recorded after the effec-
tive date of the governing statute.' 32 The remaining six states' statutes are
wholly retroactive; thus, they grant superpriority status as to all other liens.
Third, of the eight extant state superlien statutes, six explicitly do not
apply to "residential" properties. Only those of Louisiana and Michigan
contain no such exemption. For example, Connecticut's superlien statute does
not apply to "real estate which consists exclusively of residential real estate.""' 3
This limitation apparently results from the lobbying efforts of residential
lenders, the FHLMC, and the FNMC.'35
Fourth, New Hampshire's statute extends superpriority status as to "busi-
ness revenues generated from the facility on which hazardous waste or hazard-
127. See MICH. COMP. LAWs ANN. § 324.20138(4) (West 1999).
128. Id. § 324.20138(5).
129. Id.
130. Id. § 324.20138(2).
131. See Dep't of Natural Res. v. Fenske (In re Forty Acres), 566 N.W.2d 652 (Mich. Ct.
App. 1997), appeal denied, 586 N.W.2d 231 (Mich. 1998) (interpreting statute as "implicitly
bestow[ing] discretion upon the trial court regarding the propriety of the superpriority lien").
132. See CoNN. GEN. STAT.ANN. § 22a-452a(f) (West Supp. 2001) ("Such [superlien] shall
take precedence over all transfers and encumbrances on or after [effective date]"); ME. REV.
STAT. ANN. tit. 38, § 1371(2XA) (West 2001) ("Any [superlien]... has precedence over all
encumbrances on real estate recorded after [effective date].").
133. While these state statutes generally allow states to obtain a lien against a residential
property for monies expended to clean up the property, the lien that arises is of normal priority
and not a superlien. See, e.g., CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 22a-452a(g) (West Supp. 2001) (stating
that lien on residential property shall only have precedence over all encumbrances recorded after
that lien); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 147-B:10-b(lI)(c) (Supp. 2001) (stating that lien on residen-
tial property shall not have priority over antecedent encumbrance).
134. CoNN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 22a-452a(f) (West Supp. 2001).
135. See SM& MONASTEksupra note 79,1 9.04[2][b][ii], at 9-59 (discussing lobbying
efforts for non-application of superlien to residential properties).
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ous materials is located and personal property located at the facility on which
hazardous waste or hazardous material is located."136 No other state's statute
affords superpriority status to anything other than the real property that the
state has expended funds to clean up. 37
Fifth, under both Louisiana's superlien statute and the Michigan automatic
superlien provision, the state's superlien enjoys superpriority as to any amounts
expended by the state that result in an increase in the value of the property
beyond the property's pre-cleanup fair market value." In effect, then, both
provisions work to preserve the priority status of previously filed and perfected
liens to the extent of the fair market value of the underlying property prior to
the state's cleanup. By contrast, all other superlien statutes confer superpriority
status on the state's lien over all liens on the entire property.
In this Article, I focus primarily on the impact of superliens on residential
lending and securitization of residential mortgages. As such, Parts IV and V
of this Article concern only the superlien statutes of Louisiana and Michigan
because the remaining six statutes expressly exempt residential properties from
their scope. The Louisiana and Michigan statutes each have distinct features.
In particular, the Louisiana statute applies only to amounts in excess of the
property's pre-cleanup fair market value. 39 The Michigan statute effectively
features two superliens.' 4 One of Michigan's superliens, the Michigan auto-
matic superlien provision, applies, like Louisiana's provision, upon filing to
the extent that the state's cleanup increases the fair market value of the prop-
erty (subject to a cap equal to the state's actual expenditures). 4' The Michigan
statute also allows for a superlien - the Michigan discretionary superlien pro-
vision - for amounts in excess of the resulting increase in the property's fair
136. N.H. REv. STAT. ANN. § 147.B:10-b(I)(b) (Supp. 2000).
137. However, Connecticut and Maine have three-year look-back rules that allow the state
to obtain a superlien as to all property that was included in a property description with the
property at issue within the previous three years. See CoNN GEN. STAT. § 22a-452a(f) (West
Supp. 2001) (stating that lien shall apply to all "real estate which has been included, within the
preceding three years, in the property description of such real estate and is contiguous to such real
estate"); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 38, § 1371(2XA) (West 2001) (stating that superlien includes
all real estate that has been included in property description of affected real estate within past
three years).
138. See LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 30:2281 (West 2000) (stating that all security interests
recorded prior to state's notice of lien shall extend only to fair market value of property prior to
remedial action by state); MICH. CoMP. LAWS ANN. § 324.20138(2), (5) (West 1999) (applying
superlien to increase in value of property beyond property's pre-cleanup market value).
139. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 1371; see note 111 and accompanying text (noting that in
Louisiana superpriority applies only to post-cleanup of property in excess of property's pre-
cleanup value).
140. MIciL CoiP. LAwsANN. § 324.20138.
141. Id. § 324.201.
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market value, but only if the attorney general applies for superpriority and the
court approves the application. 42
In short, then, only one state superlien statute - Michigan's - allows a
superlien to apply to the pre-cleanup fair market value of a residential prop-
erty and applies only if the state attorney general seeks and the court grants
such relief 43 As such, lenders' rights to the pre-cleanup fair market value of
a residential property in which they hold security interests remains essentially
unfettered by any state's superlien statute.
IV Benefits of a Superlien Statute
In this Part, I discuss the probable benefits of a superlien law. In particu-
lar, I focus on the effects on environmental quality and state budgeting. I con-
clude that a state superlien law is likely to lead both to improved environmen-
tal quality in the jurisdiction and to less taxpayer expense for site cleanups.
The extent of these benefits varies according to the state's approach to fund-
ing environmental cleanups.
A superlien statute generally increases the likelihood that a state will
undertake an environmental cleanup. This makes sense, given the fact that
such a statute makes it more likely that the state will recover at least some
portion of the funds it expends to conduct the cleanup.I"
In addition, a superlien statute may increase the likelihood that lenders
themselves undertake cleanups. This is because, in the absence of a superlien
statute, a lender has an incentive to wait until the state cleans up the property
and then to apply its superior lien to realize a windfall increase in the value
of the property that results from the cleanup, rather than expend its own
money to clean up the property. A superlien may reduce this incentive.'45 To
the extent that lenders opt to finance their own cleanups, this has the effect of
142. Id.
143. Id. §§ 324.20138(2), (5).
144. See David H. Topol, Hazardous Waste and Bankruptcy: Confronting the Unasked
Questions, 13 VA. ENVTL. L.J. 185,226 (1994) ("The added benefit of superliens [as compared
to ordinary liens] is that they apply to property that is already secured and therefore increase the
government's ability to collect on environmental claims at the expense of other creditors. The
ability to displace secured creditors will enable the government to collect significantly more
money.").
145. See Bozarth, supra note 10, at 322:
Arguably, a superlien expedites resolution of the environmental and economic prob-
lems caused by release of hazardous materials. A superlien discourages a lender, in
a conventional lien state, from dragging its feet on cleanup and foreclosure while
hoping that the state will shoulder the costs of the remedial work. When the state's
response statute grants the state no lien or only a conventional lien, a lender can
foreclose the state's lien and realize a recovery on the freshly cleaned property.
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reducing expenditures by the state and, presumably, the effect of increasing
the total number of cleanups. To the extent that the state is more likely to
undertake cleanups, the frequencies of cleanups will be greater. This, in turn,
will increase the overall environmental quality in the state.
Thus, an increase in the ability and likelihood of the state to obtain reim-
bursement for environmental cleanup expenditures should increase overall
environmental quality in the state. However, the extent to which a superlien
statute results in more state cleanups varies with the funding mechanism that
the state uses to finance environmental cleanups. The vast majority of U.S.
jurisdictions (forty-nine states, as well as Puerto Rico) emulate the model of
the federal CERCLA statute"4 and provide for a separate state fund dedicated
to environmental cleanups (referred to as a "dedicated fund").,47 A dedicated
fund finances environmental cleanups conducted by the state, and recoveries
from private parties as compensation for cleanup expenses financed by the
state are paid into the dedicated fund. Only two United States jurisdictions,
Nebraska and the District of Columbia, provide for no such dedicated fund
(such states are "general environmental fund states").14 Environmental
cleanups conducted by the state come from funds subject to annual appropria-
tion by the state legislature.'49
A superlien statute will have a different overall effect in a dedicated fund
state than it will in a general environmental fund state. A superlien statute
increases the likelihood that a state will recover funds it expends to clean up
contaminated properties. This means that states having dedicated funds will
find them more easily replenished. Because state decision-makers presumably
will be aware of this, the state should be able to, and therefore should be more
likely to, undertake more environmental cleanups with a superlien statute than
without. It follows that one reasonably can expect environmental quality to be
higher in a dedicated fund state that has a superlien statute than in a state
without one.
To some degree at least, the same can be said of the effect of a superlien
statute in a general environmental fund state. At the same time, however, it
seems logical and likely that not all the funds recovered by the state and paid
into the general state environmental fund (or the state treasury) will find their
way to be used again to finance environmental cleanups. Rather, such funds
146. See 26 U.S.C. § 9507 (1994) (establishing fund); CERCLA § 111, 42 U.S.C. § 9611
(1994) (detailing uses of fund).
147. See ELI STATE SUTPERFUND REPORT, supra note 78, § I.E, at 15 (discussing dedicated
funds and dedicated fund states). For ease of exposition, I refer to U.S. jurisdictions, such as
the District of Columbia and Puerto Rico, as states.
148. See id. (stating that Nebraska and District of Columbia have no authorized cleanup
fund).
149. See id. at 14 (discussing funds set aside by state for environmental cleanups).
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might be redirected to fund other environmental (or even non-environmental)
priorities or, even more likely, used to justify reducing budget allocations to
the state environmental agency. Whether decision-makers deem it appropriate
to cut environmental funding or to use the benefits from the superlien statute
to fund other initiatives (and thus to justify cutting direct funding of those
initiatives), they reasonably can be expected to pass some of the benefits
contributed by the superlien statute on to constituents in the form of tax
cuts. ' Thus, the effect of the passage of a superlien statute on a general
environmental fund state is likely to comprise (i) increased environmental
quality, though less than in a comparable dedicated fund state, and (ii) an
increase in the funds generally available to the state government.
It is likely that a dedicated fund would have a greater positive impact on
overall environmental quality than would the enactment of a superlien statute.
A superlien statute simply increases the incentive for the state to engage in
environmental cleanups without guaranteeing that any level of funding in fact
will be devoted to that purpose; a dedicated fund envisions funds being
allotted in advance to environmental cleanup."' Moreover, a superlien statute
150. It is conceivable, too, that decision-makers might determine that funds devoted to
environmental cleanup are a "good investment" for the government, and accordingly increase
funding for that purpose. At some point, however, it would seem that decision-makers would
want to capture the economic benefits delivered to the government by a superlien statute, and
that they would use those benefits to pass along tax cuts to constituents, thus shoring up and
even increasing political support.
151. See ELI STATE SUPERFUND REPORT, supra note 78, § I.E, at 14-15. The Report
states the following:
A State must be able to pay for its activities in cleaning up sites. A readily available
source of money is, therefore, an essential element of a State's program to clean up
sites. Experience has shown that a fund separated from the operating funds of the
environmental agency and continuing from year to year without the need for annual
appropriations or other legislative action allows the agency to avoid disruptions to
cleanups. A fund allows a State to investigate, plan, design and conduct emergency
response and remedial actions at sites where immediate action is required or where
[responsible parties] are unavailable, unable, or unwilling to conduct or pay for
remedial actions. At least some of these expenditures can be replaced through cost
recovery and must be replenished from other sources. A State may also incur certain
expenses that it is not authorized to recover form [responsible parties], including some
administrative costs.
A [dedicated] fund also allows a State to control the pace of cleanups; if [respon-
sible parties] do not agree to conduct the cleanup, the State will be able to use its own
funds to clean up the site without delay.... For a State to maintain control over the
time sites are cleaned up, a State must have enough money available to pay for cleanup
activities when they become necessary. Money should also be available to pay for
responses to emergencies and for unexpected expenses, such as for activities at sites
where anticipated agreements with [responsible parties] are not reached....
A State [dedicated] fund can also be a significant contributor to a State's cleanup
enforcement program. If the State can clean up a site with State funds and promptly
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is beneficial only where there is value in the property after cleanup, whereas
a dedicated fund has more general applicability."
The foregoing allows some insight into the likely preferences of environ-
mentalists and budget-constraint advocates as to whether a state should have
a dedicated fund, a superlien statute, neither, or both. Table 2 presents these
preferences for environmentalists. The columns tell whether or not the state
enacts a superlien statute, and the rows represent whether the state is a dedi-
cated fund state or not. The number in each box of the grid is the payoff-
that is, the relative preference' 53 - of environmentalists to each possible
combination of row and column.
Table 2 - Environmentalists'Preferences:
What Sort of Lien Statute?
None Standard Lien Superlien
Dedicated Fund No 1 2 3
State? Yes 4 5 6
Based upon the preferences set forth in Table 2, one can construct the
ranking of environmentalists as to the possible governmental legal structures
in terms of whether the state should have a superlien statute and whether the
state should be a dedicated fund state. That ranking is presented in Table 3.
Table 3 - Environmentalists' Ranking
Ranking Structure of State Environmental Regime
1 Dedicated Fund, Superlien Statute
2 Dedicated Fund, Standard Lien Statute
3 Dedicated Fund, No Lien Statute
4 No Dedicated Fund, Superlien Statute
5 No Dedicated Fund, Standard Lien Statute
6 No Dedicated Fund, No Lien Statute
recover its costs, then [responsible parties] may decide that it is in their interests to
agree to conduct future cleanups. States that have demonstrated this ability have been
able to reach agreements with [responsible parties].
Id.
152. See id. (describing how dedicated funds allow for cleanup without waiting for funds
or remedial action from landowners).
153. These payoffs, or relative preferences, are just that. They do not purport to be actual
measures of utility. As such, they are not additive, nor, for example, should a payoff of "2" be
interpreted as twice as desirable as a payoff of "."
59 WASH. & LEE L. REV 127 (2002)
One can construct, along similar lines, a similar preference grid and rank-
ing for budget-constraint advocates. Tables 4 and 5 present such a grid and
ranking.
Table 4 - Budget-Constraint Advocates'Preferences:
What Sort of Lien Statute?
None Standard Lien Superlien
Dedicated Fund No 2 3 4
State? Yes 1 1 1
Table 5 - Budget-Constraint Advocates'Ranking
Ranking Structure of State Environmental Regime
1 No Dedicated Fund, Superlien Statute
2 No Dedicated Fund, Standard Lien Statute
3 No Dedicated Fund, No Lien Statute
(tie) 4 Dedicated Fund, Superlien Statute
(tie) 4 Dedicated Fund, Standard Lien Statute
(tie) 4 Dedicated Fund, No Superlien Statute
It should be borne in mind that these Tables provide some information
about different peoples' likely preferences, in the abstract, as to six different
environmental regulatory structures. In reality, decisions as to whether or not
a state should have a dedicated fund and whether or not a superlien statute
should be enacted are not made in tandem. Indeed, the debate over superlien
statutes is more recent and generally made against a backdrop that features the
presence or absence of a dedicated fund. Given that, it appears that environ-
mentalists will favor (as they always would) enactment of a superlien statute,
whether or not the state has a dedicated fund, and would favor a standard lien
to no lien at all. By contrast, budget-constraint advocates will favor enact-
ment of a superlien statute if the state has no dedicated fund. If the state has
a dedicated fund, budget-constraint advocates generally should be ambivalent
about enactment of a superlien statute.
V Costs of a Superlien Statute
The discussion in Part IV explained that superlien statutes offer some
combination of two benefits: higher environmental quality and lower net gov-
ernment expenditures on environmental cleanups. Accordingly, it predicted
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that environmentalists and budget-constraint advocates generally would sup-
port, or at least not oppose, superlien legislation.
Superlien statutes also impose costs on society. What are these costs,
how much are they, and on whom do they fall? In answering these questions,
I advance the thesis that these costs are relatively minor in the residential
mortgage lending context absent the market pressures of securitization. How-
ever, by putting a premium on uniformity of law across state lines, securitiza-
tion magnifies the costs in states with superlien statutes. I test this hypothesis
by examining the costs associated with superlien statutes on mortgage lending
in the absence of, and then in the presence of, the effects of securitization.
In Part V.A, I consider the nature and extent of these costs in the absence
of securitization's influence. This analysis consists of four parts. In Part
V.A. 1, 1 explain that the immediate impact of superlien statutes generally falls
on mortgage lenders and borrowers. I describe this impact with a focus on the
effects of superlien statutes on residential mortgage pricing (again in the
absence of securitization's influence). In Part V.A.2, I consider the conven-
tional wisdom, proffered by commentators, that superlien statutes will have
a substantial impact on mortgage pricing. I posit that these arguments, while
perhaps relevant in the commercial mortgage lending arena, are not persuasive
in the context of residential mortgage lending. In Part V.A.3, I argue more
generally (still in the absence of securitization's influence) that superlien
statutes should have much less of a pricing impact on residential, as opposed
to commercial, mortgage lending. Last, in Part V.A.4, I employ a net present
value residential mortgage model to estimate the actual cost that a superlien
statute imposes on mortgage lenders and borrowers. The model suggests that
these costs will not be significant.
In Part V.B, I consider how the expansion of securitization may augment
the costs associated with superlien statutes. I argue that superlien statutes
increase the cost of lending substantially once securitization is introduced
insofar as superlien statutes create nonuniformity in pertinent law across state
lines while securitization markets are impaired by nonuniformity. I also argue
that the particular nature of legal nonuniformity and unpredictability that
superlien statutes introduce as to the priority of security interests in property
is particularly problematic for mortgage lenders and securitization promoters
because it directly implicates the fundamental underpinnings of the mortgage
lending and securitization industries.
A. Costs of Superlien Statutes to Residential Mortgage Lenders and
Borrowers, in the Absence of Securitization
1. Superlien Statutes'Effect on ResidentialMortgage Lenders andBorrowers
Even putting the demands and pressures of securitization to the side, there
can be little doubt but that a superlien law increases the price of borrowed
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funds by some amount. As an initial matter, one can note that additional recov-
eries made by the state through use of a superlien statute - at the expense of
secured lenders - are used to fund improvements in environmental quality in
dedicated fund states, and a mix of environmental quality improvements and
tax cuts in other states. Because lenders pass some portion of these costs on to
borrowers,'54 lenders and borrowers both, in effect, subsidize these societal
benefits.
A successfully obtained and exercised superlien likely will result in a
situation where a secured lender does not recover on foreclosure funds that it
otherwise would have recovered.' 5 Thus, the threat of a superlien decreases
lenders' likely recovery rate and amount on foreclosure. It is logical that this
would have an impact on the practices of, and rates charged by, lenders.1
56
First, lenders endeavor to minimize their exposure to the risk that a
superlien statute might trump their security interests. They have done this, in
connection with prospective loans, by mandating that research, searches, and
inspections be undertaken to verify that (i) no superlien is currently pending
against the subject property, and that (ii) in the past no activity has taken
154. Cf Michael H. Schill, An Economic Analysis ofMortgagor Protection Laws, 77 VA.
L. REV. 489, 507 (1991) [hereinafter Schill, Economic Anaysis] ("If mortgagor protection laws
generate substantial costs, economic theory suggests that lenders in a competitive market will
pass these costs along to borrowers."). The degree to which lenders will be able to pass costs
to borrowers depends upon the elasticity of demand for mortgage loans. Id. at 507 n.63.
155. That will be so, unless it is the case that, without a superlien, there would have been
no cleanup and thus the mortgagee never would have foreclosed because the subject property
was valueless. Cf Butterworth, supra note 95, at 185 ("[Without a superlien statute, the lender
may elect not to foreclose on the property until the government responds to the contamination.
The lender may then foreclose, purchase, and dispose of the property in order to recover the
value of the collateral that has been restored and enhanced at the taxpayers['] expense.").
156. Environmental superliens also have affected the practices of title insurance compa-
nies. "The title insurance industry... has responded to the existence of superliens by revising
standard contract forms, expanding title searches, and receiving from the EPA periodic lists of
properties on which CERCLA liens have been filed." Clark, supra note 84, at 229; see
MOSKOWTZ, supra note 5, § 24.8, at 337 ("In 1987, [the American Land Title Association], in
cooperation with FNMA, designed a clause for use in transactions involving residential prop-
erties that requires the title insurance company to search for environmental liens recorded in
federal courts, but still allows the exclusion for state 'superliens.'"). See Bozarth, supra note
10, at 313-14 (describing ALTA's arrangement with EPA to obtain periodic lists of properties
subject to CERCLA liens).
On the subject of insurance coverage explicitly for the risk of superliens, Robert Bozarth
explains that "[tlitle insurance superlien coverage in loan policies was available in Connecticut,
Massachusetts, and New Hampshire until 1987." Id. at 336 (footnote omitted). However, state
insurance commissioners determined that the coverage was violative of state restrictions on title
insurance companies. Id. at 338. By then, moreover, "most title insurers had independently
decided the superlien risk was too great and withdrew the supeflien coverage from the market.
Now the major title insurers not only refuse to extend coverage against superliens but also
refuse to reinsure policies containing the coverage." Id.
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place on (or even near) the property that might require an environmental
cleanup of the property in the future, thus exposing the lender to the possible
entry of a superlien.1 57
Second, lenders will charge more for borrowed money in order to pass
some portion of the risk posed by a superlien statute onto borrowers.""8 This
increase in interest rate charge translates into an upward shift in the industry-
157. See Robert McCabe, Managing EnvironmentalRisk, 55 MORTGAGE BANKiNG 87,87
(1995) ("Environmental due diligence can be viewed as simply one of the costs of doing busi-
ness in today's market."). Sondra Mulkeen stated the following:
Connecticut banks are understandably nervous about the effects of [federal and state
superfund] laws. As a result, they have decided en masse that the only acceptable
environmental risk is no environmental risk. No commercial property gets a mortgage
in Connecticut anymore without an "environmental assessment report." This report
must be prepared by the buyer at his/her own expense. The bank utilizes this informa-
tion to decide whether or not this is a "good sale" (i.e.[,] whether or not to lend money).
If a clean-up is required, the buyer must then obtain approval from the [state Depart-
ment of Environmental Protection] before the mortgage is granted. This process
consists of a report researched by experts in the field (the aforementioned environmen-
tal assessment report), as well as a detailed remediation plan.
Sondra Mulkeen, Clean-Up: The Cost and the Trade-Offs, Bus. J.-HARTFORD, Apr. 24, 1989,
at 6:. Cf. Daniel R. Fischel, The Economics of Lender Liability, 99 YALE L.J. 131, 136 (1989)
(describing how borrowers may agree to allow lenders to maintain, inter alia, "monitoring
mechanisms" in situations in which lenders fear "debtor misconduct" in order to "decrease the
amount of [interest] compensation" demanded by lenders).
That is not to say that the absence of superlien legislation removes any incentive for
lenders to implement such measures. Rather, the mere passage of legislation authorizing liens
for state environmental expenses - even if not superliens - likely will induce lenders to
undertake such measures. However, because the threat of a standard lien imposes far less risk
on lenders than does the thret of a superlien, the incentive to mitigate that risk will be far
greater with passage of superlien legislation. See Hamel, supra note 5, at 854 ("The dangers
of superliens and, to a much lesser degree, non-priority liens, are such that lenders have
adjusted their lending activities to account for the new risks." (emphasis added)); see also
Burkhart, supra note 28, at 298-303 (discussing possible liability and risks of environmental
pollution for lenders and borrowers of secured real estate and need for environmental assess-
ment of secured real estate).
Due diligence one day may be supplanted by environmental insurance. Insurers who are
long wary of offering insurance against what were perceived to be unpredictable environmental
risks, have begun to venture into the field. See infra note 163 (describing insurance companies'
willingness to offer coverage on environmental risks). Recently, major ratings agencies
approved "the use of environmental insurance in lieu of, or in addition to, standard environmen-
tal due diligence assessments for commercial mortgage securitizations." Adam Tempkin,
Enviro-Insurance Emerges as Option to Due Diligence, INVESTMENT DEAuRs' DIGEST, June
21,1999, at 4; see also DUFF & PHELPS CREDIT RATING CO., CMBS METHODOLOGY: CRITERIA
FOR USING SECURED CREDITOR ENViRONMENTAL INSURANCE (1999).
158. See Fischel, supra note 157, at 133-34 (describing how lenders consider likelihood
of default and likely recovery on default in setting terms of loans). See also id. at 136 ("The
greater the amount of anticipated debtor misconduct, the greater the compensation (i.e., the
higher interest rate) that a lender will demand.").
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wide supply curve for mortgage-backed funds. This effect is represented in
Figure 2, in which D represents the industry-wide demand curve for borrowed
mortgage-backed funds, S, represents the industry-wide supply curve before
the enactment of a superlien statute, and S2 corresponds with the industry-
wide supply curve after enactment. As the figure reveals, this shift in the
supply curve effects (i) an increase in the equilibrium price for mortgage-
backed funds, i.e., an increase in the interest rate charged by lenders, from pi
to P2,1 "59 and (ii) a decrease in the amount of funds borrowed from ch to q2,
which translates into fewer mortgage loans made.
Figure 2: Demand curve and supply curves for mortgage loans




2. Evaluation of the Conventional Wisdom: Superlien Statutes Directly
and Substantially Affect Residential Mortgage Pricing
The foregoing information makes it clear that one reasonably might expect
a superlien statute to result in an increase in the price of mortgage-backed
funds. The question remains: how great will that increase be? Commentators
159. See Harry F. Klodowski, Jr., Redevelopment Under State Superfund Laws, RISK
MOM., Feb. 1, 1995, at 29 ("[Tlhe existence of a priority lien is often a compelling reason for
them to refuse to make the loan, or at least to charge a higher rate of interest to compensate for the
increased risk").
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generally assume that the increase will be large and have offered varying justi-
fications for that conclusion. Retaining the focus on residential mortgage
lending, I now turn to an examination of these justifications. I conclude that
none are persuasive.
At first blush, one might comprehend the threat that superlien statutes
pose to lenders simply as the possibility that lenders' prior liens might be
superseded by subsequently filed superliens. The concept of a subsequent lien
taking precedence over a prior lien is hardly novel, however: Many state laws
provide that liens for recovery of real estate taxes take precedence over other
liens, even where the holders of the prior liens have filed and perfected those
liens before the tax lien arises." ° Thus, it seems unlikely that the mere fact
that a superlien is a retroactive lien is alone the cause of lenders' great enmity
toward superlien statutes. The problem for lenders with retroactive environ-
mental liens, as opposed to retroactive tax liens, is that the latter are far more
predictable, both in terms of occurrence and magnitude. As Grant Nelson and
Dale Whitman explain:
Granting automatic senior status to real estate tax liens usually poses no
significant problem for the mortgage[s] because they frequently "escrow"
for such liabilities and, in any event, can predict with relative certainty the
extent of their. . .future tax burden. On the other hand, ... finding and
predicting environmental problems represents a much less manageable task
for the mortgagee .... 161
Robert Bozarth echoes: "[R]eal estate taxes also enjoy a superpriority, but
prospective purchasers and lenders can discover current and delinquent tax
liabilities in the title examination. In addition, the total tax delinquency rarely
exceeds a fraction of the value of a commercial or industrial property."'162
However, as time passes and experience with environmental cleanups
grows, it becomes easier to quantify the likelihood and magnitude of environ-
mental risks. 63 Thus, the retroactivity of superlien statutes may not present
160. See, e.g., CAL. REV. & TAX CODE § 2192.1 (West 1998) ("Every tax declared in this
chapter to be a lien on real property, and every public improvement assessment declared by law
to be a lien on real property, have priority over all other liens on the property, regardless of the
time of their creation."). See also Newman, supra note 5, at 43.012 ("The most obvious and
common known lien having a superpriority is the lien for real estate taxes."); supra note 79
(providing definitions for "superlien" that clearly encompass liens for real estate taxes that enjoy
first priority status).
161. 1 NELSON & WHrMIAN, supra note 5, § 4.50, at 291 (footnotes omitted). On this
basis, Nelson and Whitman conclude that "the current lack of priority status for the CERCLA
lien probably represents sound policy" and that by implication state superlien laws do not. Id.
162. Bozarth,supra note 10,at323.
163. Thus, while insurers long shied away from offering coverage for environmental risks,
they now are able profitably to underwrite such coverage. See supra note 157 (discussing how
insurance companies have begun to offer coverage for environmental risks); see also Jonathan
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as sizeable a pricing problem for lenders as one at first might think. More-
over, while Bozarth's comment on the relative size of tax delinquencies helps
explain why superlien statutes might cause large price increases in the com-
mercial mortgage context, it suggests that price increases in the residential
context would be comparatively minimal.
A more likely cause for an increase in residential mortgage pricing is a
superlien statute that allows state liens to trump other liens that were perfected
before the effective date of the statute, i.e., liens where the lenders were not
on notice of the possible applicability of a superlien statute and thus had no
opportunity to charge a premium for that additional risk. Notably, the superli-
en statutes in Connecticut and Maine avoid this problem because they vest
superpriority in state liens only as to liens that were perfected after the respec-
tive statute's effective date.'" Residential lenders in these states nonetheless
sought, successfully, residential property exemptions. Moreover, the fact that
a state superlien statute may apply to liens that were perfected before the
statute's effective date should not impact the pricing of residential mortgages
issued today, i.e., after the statute has gone into effect.
Mark Budnitz and Helen Chaitman disagree that retroactivity is the
lender's central problem with superlien statutes. While conceding that "t]here
is nothing a lender can do to prevent the imposition of a retroactive lien on
contaminated property," 165 they assert:
In practice, the imposition of such a lien may be of no consequence to the
lender. The lender may not even wish to enforce its security interest on
contaminated property, given the risk of the lender's liability as an owner
for the cleanup. Moreover, once the property is cleaned up, the possibility
of unfound waste will leave the property undervalued.'"
Rather, Budnitz and Chaitman argue that the "greatest concern" for
lenders arising out of superlien statutes is "the lien on business revenues that
might otherwise be used to satisfy the business's debt to its lender."167 This
argument persuasively suggests that superlien statutes may cause commercial
mortgage lenders to increase substantially the cost of borrowed funds to insure
against this increased risk. At the same time, this argument implies by omis-
sion that residential lenders will not experience a similar motivation.
R. Nash, Note, Environmental Law: An Economic Approach to the Availability of Hazardous
Waste Insurance, 1991 ANN. SURV. AM. L. 455.
164. See supra text accompanying note 103 (listing statutory provisions of Connecticut and
Maine).




B. Comparison of the Costs Associated with Superlien Statutes in the
Residential and Commercial Mortgage Lending Arenas
The foregoing discussion established that commentators' proffered rea-
sons for heightened mortgage pricing resulting from superlien statutes, while
applicable to commercial mortgage lending, are not persuasive in the context
of residential mortgage lending. An examination of the risks faced by residen-
tial, as opposed to commercial, mortgage lenders confirms this dichotomy.
As an initial matter, the argument that enactment of a superlien statute
substantially reduces mortgage lenders' expected recovery on mortgage
default in the case of residential property seems dubious. The chance of a
residential site being environmentally contaminated - or even subject to a risk
of such contamination - is smaller than the comparable risk for commercial
property. Activities carried on at a site that is used for residential purposes
are exceedingly unlikely to result in environmental contamination. Thus,
contamination of residential properties is far more likely to result from activi-
ties conducted at adjacent or nearby properties. It tends to be the case, how-
ever - whether for reasons of zoning'" and planned development or simply
because of consumer preference - that residences are likely to be located near
other residences. This further reduces the risk of a residential property
becoming environmentally contaminated.
Second, lenders can act to minimize their risk even if some residential
properties in which they hold a security interest become contaminated. In
spite of the foregoing, risks of contamination at residential properties remain.
A residential property may have become contaminated because of activities
conducted at the site before its current residential use. That risk, however, is
one that a prospective lender should be able to avoid (or at least knowingly
undertake) with the help of due diligence. Due diligence should also mitigate
the risk that a residential site that is not currently contaminated might become
contaminated because of activities at a nearby site.
Third, even if a residential site is contaminated (or becomes contami-
nated), it does not necessarily mean that the owner of the property will be
pursued to recover response or remedial costs at the site. Indeed, it is the
policy of the EPA not to pursue innocent landowners.169 If state authorities
168. See William D. MoElyea, Playing the Numbers Game: Local GovernmentAuthority
toApply Use Quotas in Neighborhood CommerialDisricts, 14 ECoLoGYL.Q. 325,349 (1987)
(discussing how zoning preserves "character of single-family residential neighborhoods").
169. See EPA: Guidance on Federal Superfund Liens, OSWER No. 9832.12, § 2 (Sept. 22,
1987), available at httpJ/es.epa.gov/oeca/osre/870922.htmi ("Regional offices should not file
notice [of a CERCLA lien] where it appears that the defendant satisfies the elements of the
innocent landowner defense . . . ."); EPA- Superfund Today - Focus on Property Issues,
OSWER No. 9378.0-09 AFS, at 5 (Sept. 2000), available at httpl/www.epa.gov/superfund/
tools/today/sitefaq2.pdf [hereinafter Superfund Today) ("EPA will not take actions against a
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follow this logical policy, then they presumably would not invoke a superlien
statute to deprive an innocent landowner of any of the value of his or her
property. Thus, the practical risk to a residential lender is comparatively small.
Fourth, even if a lender cannot avoid all risk that the state may clean up
a residential site in which it holds a security interest and may rely on a superli-
en statute to trump the lender's interest, the lender may be no worse off in the
long run, and indeed even may be better off. To the extent a property is con-
taminated or is likely to become contaminated, the lender may face recovery
below the value of its security interest even in the absence of a superlien
statute. This is because, as I discuss above, a superlien statute makes environ-
mental cleanups more likely to occur. 7 ° That being the case, if a cleanup of
a property would not occur in the absence of a superlien statute, then the
property is likely to remain contaminated and therefore worth substantially
less - perhaps below (possibly even far below) the value of the lender's
security interest. In addition, because more common and frequent environ-
mental cleanups tend to enhance overall environmental quality - and therefore
property values in general - lenders may in the long run prefer to have a
superlien statute in effect.'
2
residential home owner, unless the owner polluted the site or made existing pollution problems
worse (a release or threat of release of hazardous substances) and forced a cleanup action by EPA
at the site."); EPA: Policy Towards Owners of Residential Property at Superfund Sites, OSWER
No. 9834.6, § I.C (July 3, 1991), available at http://es.epa.gov/oeca/osre/910703.html ("In the
past, the Agency has not required owners of residential property located on a Superfund site to
perform response actions or pay response actions or pay response costs except where the
residential homeowners' activities lead to a release or threat of a release of hazardous substances,
resulting in the taking of a response action at the site .... The purpose of this policy is to
continue the Agency's past practice and to provide guidance for Agency enforcement staff.").
170. See supra notes 144-45 and accompanying text (noting that superlien statute increases
likelihood of environmental cleanup).
171. See Superfund Today, supra note 169, at 3 ("Property values can be affected by a
number of environmental factors: perceived health risks, impacts on safe drinking water, air
pollution; odor, construction activity, and noise."); Thomas M. Carroll, The Economic Impact
of a Transient Hazard on Property Values: The 1988 PEPCON Explosion in Henderson,
Nevada, 13 J. REAL EST. FIN. & ECON. 143 (1996) (stating that property values are sensitive to
mean distance of property from hazard); cf. Christopher G. Leggett & Nancy E. Bockstaal, Evi-
dence of the Effects of Water Quality on Residentia Land Values, 39 J. ENVTL. ECON. & MGMr.
121 (2000) (using land value as proxy to measure marginal willingness to pay to live alongside
cleaner water); Jeffrey E. Zabel & Katherine A. Kid, Estimating the Demand for Air Quality
in Four U.S. Cities, 76 LAND ECON. 174 (2000) (using housing prices as proxy to measure mar-
ginal willingness to pay for cleaner air).
172. But see Thomas M. McMahon, Lender's Perspectives on Hazardous Waste and Simi-
lar Liabilities, 18 Envtl. L. Rep. (Envtl. L. Inst.) 10,368,10,369 (Sept. 1988). McMahon states
the following:
Some lenders may view the possibility of a government cleanup as a potential
windfall, because they assume that the government will clean up the site to their
benefit. There is a distinction, however, between a cleanup sufficient to protect
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C. Economic Analysis of the Costs Associated with Superlien Statutes
That Apply to Residential Properties
More precise methods of estimating the likely economic effect of a
superlien statute on residential mortgage pricing reinforce the conclusion that
the costs associated with superlien statutes are, at least in the absence of
securitization, insignificant. I employ a net present value model of a mortgage
to examine and estimate the precise economic effect of a superlien statute on
residential mortgage pricing.' Let:
V = the initial principal balance of the loan;
T = the term of the loan;
T = the year in which the loan is prepaid;
i = the annual interest rate of the mortgage;
n = the annual inflation rate;
Lt= the principal balance of the loan in any year t;
Co = the net cost to the lender of originating the loan;
C= the annual cost to the lender of servicing the loan;7
r = the lender's cost of finds;
M = the annual lump sum payment by the borrower to the
lender;1
75
dt= the probability that the borrower will default in any year t;
Rt= the revenue received by the lender from the foreclosure sale
and deficiency judgment;176
h = the time between the borrower's last payment and the date
the lender receives R,;
against an imminent hazard, and a full cleanup, in which the waste material is
removed and the remedy is permanent. If the government sees that a lender may
get a windfall benefit, it is likely to preserve its own resources and seek an
interim solution. It will do just enough to protect the public health and other
sensitive environmental concerns and then let the chips fall where they may.
Id.
173. This use of a net present value model to estimate the economic impact of a superlien
statute on residential mortgage pricing is based upon the use by Michael Schill of a similar
model to estimate the economic impact of mortgagor protection laws. See Schill, Economic
Analysis, supra note 154, at 501-07 (constructing model to estimate economic impact of mort-
gagor protection laws).
174. I assume that C, increases each year by the inflation rate n, C, = CI(1 + ,r)t. See Schill,
Economic Analysis, supra note 154, at 501 n.49 (assuming that lender's annual cost of servicing
loan increases each year by inflation rate).
175. M = iV/(1-1/((1+i)T.)). Thus, the model assumes annual mortgage loan payments,
rather than the monthly payments most mortgages require. The results between the two ap-
proaches do not vary greatly. See Schill, Economic Analy4is, supra note 154, at 502 n.50 (using
annual mortgage loan payments in model).
176. R,-L 1
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F, = the cost to the lender of foreclosing the mortgage and bring-
ing a deficiency judgment action; 77 and
0= the proportion of the loan balance recovered by the lender by
virtue of the foreclosure sale and deficiency judgment.
The net present value of a mortgage equals the sum of the following
component cash flows to the lender:
(1) - V- C O ,
constituting the payment by the lender of the loan principal and origination
cost;
T(M - Ct)(l- d. )
t- (1+ r) '
constituting the discounted value of the regularly scheduled payments re-
ceived by the lender for the years that the borrower remains in good standing;
T-I L(3) (1- d) (
t=1 T~~
constituting the discounted value of all loan prepayments received by the
lender; and
T-1 d( R ,(4) Z -t 
(lR~ "F+
t I (1 + r)t
constituting the discounted value of all net revenue received by the lender
from the foreclosure sale and deficiency judgment.
Thus, the net present value equals:
t T-IT. T dt((--rrh R Ft)
-- + fO "Jr" (M- Ct)(l- Ed.) (1 T-1 L T - 1 " (1 + r
0_ (l+ "'w rI ld)UtO + (1+ r)t,., (I _y . -,
177. I assume that Ft increases each year by the inflation rate r, F, - FI(1 + )t. See Schill,
Economic Anaysis, supra note 154, at 502 n.52 (assuming that cost to lender of foreclosing
mortgage and bringing deficiency judgment action will increase each year by inflation rate).
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I assume that most of the variables in the model remain constant through-
out the net present value simulation. In particular, I assume, in keeping with
current mortgage and economic data, that:
V = $80,000;178  Tm = 30 years;
T = year 9; 179 CT = $161;
d, = 0.04%;81 d2 = 0.12%;
d3 = 0.28%; d4 = 0.52%;
d5 = 0.83%; d6 = 0.90%;
d7 = 0.75%; ds = 0.66%;
h = 3 months;1 2 r = 6%; and
at=5%.
178. This assumes a $100,000 purchase price and a loan-to-value ratio of 80%. See Terms
on Conventional Home Mortgages - 2000, available at httpA/www.fhfb.gov/mirs/mirstbl9.htm
(last visited Mar. 23, 2002) (indicating that 43% of mortgages nationwide have loan-to-value
ratio of between 70.1% and 80.0%); Schill, Economic Analysis, supra note 154, at 503 n.54
(using same value for V under similar assumption).
179. Schill explains that "[r]elatively few loans are held to maturity because borrowers pre-
pay them to move elsewhere, obtain a lower interest rate, or default." Schill, Economic Anal-
ysis, supra note 154, at 503 n.56. In presenting a net present value mortgage model, Schill
notes that "[e]stimates of an average mortgage fife range from seven to twelve years," and uses
a mortgage life of nine years in a net present value calculation similar to the one I present here.
Id. at 503 n.56; see also Brent W. Ambrose & Charles A. Capone, The Hazard Rates of First
and Second Default, 20 J. REAL EST. FIN. & ECON. 275,284 (2000) ("Each month from orig-
ination increases the probability of prepayment. . . by 38 percent .... Simulations show a
marked decline in the hazard[ ] of prepayment... after month[ ] 48.... ."); Tyler T. Yang et
al., An Analysis of the Ex Ante Properties ofMortgage Prepayment and Default, 26 REAL EST.
EcoN. 651,659 fig.1 (1998) (presenting empirical data on mortgage prepayment rates).
180. Here, I use the number used by Schill in 1990, augmented by an annual 6% inflation
rate to account for the intervening decade. Schill, Economic Anaysis, supra note 154, at 503.
This amount represents the initial year. See supra note 174.
181. Values for default probabilities are based upon empirical data presented in Yang et
al., supra note 179, at 660 fig. 2. See also Ambrose & Capone, supra note 179, at 284 ("Each
month from origination increases the probability of... default by... 5.6% .... Simulations
show a marked decline in the hazard[ ] of... first default after month[ ] ... 60 .... "). As
Schill did, I use default rates in excess of actual empirical default rates "[in order to present a
'worst possible case' scenario." Schill, Economic Analysis, supra note 154, at 503 n.55. I note
that the default probabilities that I use are significantly lower than the probabilities Schill used
for years one through five, and higher for years five through eight - in other words, my
assumptions predict that default, if it occurs, is more likely to occur later in the term of the
mortgage. Id. at 503. Also, the total probability of default in years one through eight is lower
under my assumptions than it is under Schill's. Id. A possible explanation for this discrepancy
is that Schill performed his computation in 1991 during an economic downturn. By contrast,
the data on which I rely come from the 1990s, the majority of which constituted good economic
times during which one might expect the probability of default to be lower.
182. See Schil, Economic Analysis, supra note 154, at 505 & n.61 (setting value ofh at
three months).
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This model does not identify variables the presence or absence of which
a superlien statute is likely to affect, such as the cost of mortgage origination,
Co; the cost of pursuing a foreclosure action, FI ; the proportion of the out-
standing loan balance that the lender can expect to recover on foreclosure, 0;
or the interest rate, i, the value of which depends upon the values of the other
variables. The value of Co is likely to be somewhat higher in a jurisdiction
that has enacted a superlien statute insofar as lenders are more likely to
undertake additional due diligence in response to the statute. Still, Co is
unlikely to be substantially higher both because lenders are likely to pass
some of the cost of the additional due diligence to borrowers'83 and because
federal and state environmental liability schemes generally prompt lenders to
undertake due diligence even in the absence of a superlien statute. 184 One also
would expect F, to be somewhat higher in a state with a superlien statute.
However, the true cost of a superlien statute is not that foreclosure of proper-
ties becomes more expensive; rather, a lender is less likely to recover as much
after a successful foreclosure than the lender would if no superlien statute
were in effect. Thus, while a superlien statute may lead to a slight increase in
F1, it is more likely to cause a substantial decrease in 0.
Assuming that mortgage markets are competitive, the net present value
of the mortgage will be zero.' Thus, by substituting in the values for the
variables listed above and by varying Co, F1, and 0, one can solve for i. In
particular, one can determine the effect of different values of Co, FI, and 0 on
i. Table 6 presents the values of i that result from different input values.
Table 6 also includes the corresponding values of M, the annual debt service,
in order to convey a more complete sense of the likely economic impact of
changes to the independent variables.
183. See supra notes 154, 158, and accompanying text (noting that lenders likely would
charge higher interest rates to compensate for incurring higher risks).
184. See supra note 157 (noting that lenders will likely undertake environmental due dili-
gence due to passage of state statutes authorizing liens for environmental expenses).
185. See Schill, Economic Analysis, supra note 154, at 503 n.53 (analyzing costs of mort-
gagor protection laws by creating model of expected returns to lenders, which assumes competi-
tive markets and zero net present value of loan).
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Table 6- Net Present Value Simulation Results
Cost of Cost of Break-Even Annual Debt
Origination Foreclosure Interest Rate (s) Service (M)
(CO) (FI)
Proportion of Loan Balance Recovered (0) = 0.98
$800 $275 6.46% $6,101
$800 $600 6.46% $6,101
$800 $3,000 6.48% $6.113
$1,200 $275 6.53% $6,145
$1,200 $600 6.54% $6,152
$1,200 $3,000 6.55% $6,158
$1,600 $275 6.61% $6,196
$1,600 $600 6.61% $6,196
$1,600 $3,000 6.63% $6,209
Proportion of Loan Balance Recovered (0) = 0.88
$800 $275 6.50% $6,126
$800 $600 6.50% $6,126
$800 $3,000 6.52% $6,139
$1,200 $275 6.58% $6,177
$1,200 $600 6.58% $6,177
$1,200 $3,000 6.60% $6,190
$1,600 $275 6.65% $6,222
$1,600 $600 6.66% $6,228
$1,600 $3,000 6.67% $6,235
Proportion of Loan Balance Recovered (0) = 0.78
$800 $275 6.54% $6,152
$800 $600 6.54% $6,152
$800 $3,000 6.56% $6,164
$1,200 $275 6.62% $6,203
$1,200 $600 6.62% $6,203
$1,200 $3,000 6.64% $6,215
$1,600 $275 6.70% $6,254
$1,600 $600 6.70% $6,254
$1,600 $3,000 6.72% $6,267
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I chose as the base case the situation where, in line with current residen-
tial mortgage data, Co = $800,186 F, = $275,1' 7 and 0 = 9 8%.l" This base
situation produces an interest rate (i) equal to 6.46%. If 0 is 88% (as one
might result under a superlien statute),"8 9 then i will increase only by four
basis points. Even reducing 0 to 78% - which seems overly pessimistic for
residential mortgages, if not for all mortgages - will increase the interest rate
by only twelve basis points with a corresponding increase of less than five
dollars in monthly debt service. 9
The data reflect that increases - indeed, even substantial increases - in
F, have only a minimal impact on i and M. Increases in Co have a greater
impact. Under the particularly unlikely case where 0 shrinks to 78% while Co
and F, increase to $1,600 and $3,000, respectively, the model predicts that i
will increase 26 basis points. While this increase is not insubstantial, it is
unlikely to occur and still represents less than a $15 increase in monthly debt
service payments. Thus, as expected, the net present value simulation predicts
186. Federal Housing Finance Board ("FHFB') mortgage data for 1999 indicate that initial
fees and charges constitute, on average, 0.74% of the mortgage value. See Fed. Hous. Fin. Bd..,
Table 1: Terms on Conventional Single-Family Mortgages, Annual National Averages, Al
Homes, available at http/www.flulb.gov/mirs/miratl.xis (last visited Mar. 23,2002) (compil-
ing annual average data on home mortgages). On a mortgage of $80,000, initial charges and
fees would average $592. Because the average loan exceeds this value, see id., and because pre-
sumably some portion of initial charges and fees is fixed and does not vary with the size of the
mortgage, I employ a slightly higher number.
The number I use for initial costs and fees is less than the number Michael Schill used -
$1,250 - in presenting a net present value mortgage cash flow model a decade ago. See SchilU,
Economic Anabsis, supra note 154, at 504 (using $1,250 as cost of initial fees throughout anal-
ysis). The FHFB explains the reasons for this change as follows:
Generally, initial fees as a percent of the loan balance have been declining since the
middle 1980's, when such fees were more than 2.5 percent of the loan balance. The
downward trend in initial fees reflects both the easing of mortgage market condi-
tions and the increased popularity of no-point, purchase-money mortgages.
Fed. Hous. Fin. Bd., Mortgage Interest Rate Survey, Conventional Mortgage Loans, available
at httpJ/www.fhfb.gov/MIRS_loans.htm.
187. See Schill, Economic Analysis, supra note 154, at 505 (using model in which F, =
$275, based on figures from Texas).
188. See id. (using model in which 0 = 0.98 is consistent with empirical evidence available
at time)
189. Specifically, one might expect 0 to be 88% if a superlien statute were in effect and
regularly invoked. In fact, as discussed above, see supra note 13 and Part VI.B, superlien
statutes have not been and are not likely to be invoked frequently, even if they might be applica-
ble in theory.
190. See Schill, Economic Analyis, supra note 154, at 505 (calculating increase in break-
even interest rate by decreasing 0 and keeping i and F, constant). Schill uses a net present
value model to gauge the impact of decreases in 0 in the context of state mortgagor protection
laws. Id. He concludes, based upon data culled from the late 1980s, that similar decreases in
0 will not have a substantial impact on i. Id. at 506.
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that the impact of a superlien statute on residential mortgage pricing is not
significant.
1 91
D. Costs of Superlien Statutes on the Residential Mortgage
Securitization Markets
Part V.A established that, at least in the absence of securitization, the
costs associated with superlien statutes are comparatively small. Part IV iden-
tified some benefits associated with superlien statutes, such as greater environ-
mental quality at less cost to the government. Part IV did not quantify those
benefits; nonetheless, it is reasonable to conclude that, given the small size of
the accompanying costs and assuming that securitization does not magnify
those costs substantially, one should not rule out superlien statutes as benefi-
cial as matters of public policy and efficiency." This Section examines
whether this assumption is a valid one.
As discussed above, securitization offers many benefits: It increases the
flow of capital into real estate markets, leads to greater flow of capital from
region to region, and ultimately results in lower interest rates.'" Securitiza-
tion can function only if its promoters successfully can "bundle together"
groups of mortgages in "mortgage pools" that serve as underlying collateral
for the securities that the promoters issue. In turn, this bundling can take
place only if the terms of the mortgages that are bundled together and the laws
that govern them are substantially similar.
That some states feature a superlien statute creates nonuniformity in the
law governing mortgage loan priority across state lines. Three options are
open to securitization promoters in addressing this nonuniformity: they can
(1) continue to bundle mortgages from different states (regardless of whether
states have superlien statutes), and either (a) calculate the price of mortgages
depending upon whether the state of origin features a superlien statute, or
191. In addition to using a net present value model, Schill relies upon a multiple regression
analysis to argue that state mortgagor protection laws do not inordinately affect the prices of
residential mortgages in states that have such laws. See id. at 507-14 (concluding that effect of
mortgagor protection laws on interest rates is statistically insignificant due to small magnitude
of actual costs associated with such loans). I do not employ a multiple regression analysis
because, as I discuss above, six of the states that have superlien statutes exempt residential
property from their scope, while the remaining two state statutes are highly unlikely to put at
risk a lender's equity in a property. See supra notes 13943 and accompanying text (describing
variations in state superlien statutes). In effect, then, no state has in place a superlien statute
that would put a lender's equity in residential property at risk as much as a superlien statute
possibly could. As a result, no state can act as a reference on which to test the economic impact
of such a statute using a multiple regression analysis.
192. See Schill, Economic Analysis, supra note 154, at 501 (arguing that costs generated
by mortgagor protection laws are not as great as lawyers and economists have argued, based on
model of expected returns to lenders).
193. See supra Part V.B (discussing benefits of securitization).
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(b) price mortgages without regard to whether their state of origin features a
superlien statute; or (2) decline to include mortgages originating in states with
superlien statutes in mortgage pools. Each of these options has drawbacks.
First, securitization promoters have the capability, at relatively low ex-
pense, to include the costs associated with superlien statutes in the formula to
determine the price of mortgages in mortgage pools.' This inclusion would
allow conduits to discount the price of mortgages originating in states that fea-
ture superlien statutes to reflect the increased risk associated with such statutes.
Two drawbacks exist for this approach. First, even if pricing mortgages
differentially because of variations in law is not expensive, myriad variations
in numerous laws in multiple states at some point will generate more substan-
tial transaction costs. Moreover, residential mortgage securitization promoters
are predominantly corporations with ties to and subject to the regulatory
oversight of the federal government. 9 Such corporations may decide that they
risk inviting congressional oversight and regulation if they price mortgages
differently according to the state of origin.'96 Indeed, "[flederally related
secondary mortgage agencies such as FNMA, GNMA and FHLMC do not
price mortgage market loans differentially to reflect the expected costs attribut-
able to state mortgage laws."''
A second approach in which conduits continue to assemble mortgage
pools with mortgages from states whose laws increase lender risk, is for the
conduits simply to ignore the heightened risk in pricing mortgages from those
states. This approach avoids the transaction costs inherent in differential
pricing, as well as the political difficulties FNMA, FHLMC, and GNMA might
encounter were they to engage in differential pricing. 9 At the same time, this
approach has drawbacks of its own. These problems arise because this ap-
proach imposes no economic burden on states that enact laws creating higher
lender risk. As a result, states without such laws subsidize the benefits that
residents of the states with these laws enjoy. In other words, this approach
194. Cf Schill, Uniformity or Diversity, supra note 39, at 1293 (stating that, "[g]iven the
elaborate pricing models already used to evaluate real estate investments, . . . an adjustment
factor for state laws is unlikely to add significantly to transaction costs" (footnotes omitted)).
195. See supra notes 47-49 and accompanying text (describing creation and responsibilities
of FNMA, FHLMC, and ONMA).
196. See Schill, Uniformity or Diversity, supra note 39, at 1293 n.159 (advancing this
theory as possible justification for failure by FNMA, ONMA, and FHLMC to price mortgage
loans differentially to reflect expected increased costs associated with variations in state
mortgage laws).
197. Id. at 1292. Schill suggests as an additional reason for this approach that the expense
of pricing the cost variations may exceed the benefits, given the modest variations in cost to
which these state law differences give rise the cost of pricing the cost variations may exceed the
benefits. Id. at 1292 n.159.
198. See supra text accompanying notes 195-97 (explaining that political difficulties of
differential pricing include congressional oversight and regulation).
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allows states with protective laws to internalize the benefits of such laws while
externalizing some of the costs. Equally pricing mortgages from all states acts
both as an artificial incentive for states to enact costly, protective laws such as
superlien statutes and as a disincentive against enactment of uniform laws that
securitization prefers." As such, this approach introduces inefficiency both
into the securitization markets and into state decision-making processes. Thus,
this option will be viable only when the amount of the increased cost, and the
number of loans featuring that increased cost, are small.2'
Additionally, whether or not securitization promoters adopt an approach
that prices mortgages differentially according to their state of origin, a great
disincentive remains against including in mortgage pools too many mortgages
that are subject to comparatively heightened risk. Credit rating agencies
examine the mortgage pools underlying mortgage-backed securities in rating
the securities; the ratings that the credit agencies give to a security determine
the market price of the security. The greater the number of higher-risk mort-
gages in an underlying mortgage pool, the lower the ratings the security will
receive and, accordingly, the higher the effective interest that the promoter
will have to promise investors to compensate them for accepting the lower
rating and higher risk."1 At some point, then, the cost of including many
199. Cf Schill, Uniformity or Diversity, supra note 39, at 1293 n.160 ("Differential pricing
of mortgage loans to reflect the cost of state laws might indirectly promote uniform real estate
finance law. Once the externality created by the secondary mortgage market is internalized,
states with exceptionally protective laws might decide that the costs of the laws outweigh their
benefits.").
200. Cf. Schill, The Impact of the CapitalMarkets, supra note 37, at 287 (noting that "[t]he
size of an individual residential loan or set of loans from a state with costly borrower protection
laws is likely to be insignificant when considered in the context of the entire pool of mortgages
backing a particular issue of securities"). Commercial mortgage loans are less likely to be
insignificant in size. Id.; see infra note 223 and accompanying text (stating that size of commer-
cial loans becomes significant because of small number of mortgages in commercial mortgage
pool).
201. See generally Mitchell Fenton, Commercial Real Estate Financing, 418 PLI/Real
Estate 1119, 1122 (1997) (noting that loans that fail to meet requirements of rating agencies
have lower ratings and thus lower prices). Fenton believes the following:
In general the standards for securitization are driven by the requirements of the
rating agencies. The rating agencies review the loan pools and assign ratings to
them based upon their income-producing potential. The failure of a loan to meet
the rating agencies' requirements will result in the loan having exceptions. The
more exceptions that a loan has to these requirements, whether in the area of due
diligence or documentation, the more likely that there will be a negative impact
on the pricing.
Id. The risk that too many mortgages in a mortgage pool might hail from a state that in-
creases the risk associated with those mortgages is a subset of "concentration risk" - the risk of
"high concentrations of payments by a relatively small number of obligors." Steven L.
Schwarcz, Structured Finance: The New Way to Securitize Assets, 11 CARB ZO L. REV. 607,
610 (1990). See also Joseph C. Shenker & Anthony J. Colletta, Asset Securitization: Evolution,
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mortgage loans from states with laws that create greater risks for lenders may
become prohibitive.'
In fact, superlien statutes introduce nonuniformity in state laws that
would impair substantially promoters' ability to include in mortgage pools
residential mortgage loans originating from those states that feature such
statutes.203 Superlien statutes threaten the cornerstone of residential mortgage
lending: predictability of lien priority.
Predictability of lien priority is of paramount importance in real estate
lending. A superlien statute substantially damages that predictability. As a
New Jersey Superior Court judge concisely explained:
Seen, not from the clinical viewpoint of an environmentalist but from the
coldly practical position of those whose interests involve the status of land
titles in New Jersey, this statute, while highly commendable in its intent[,]
is, with respect to land tiles, a hibernating time bomb. Our whole system
of recordation of land titles depends upon the ability of one who seeks to
acquire an interest in real property to ascertain beyond peradventure the
true state of the title. The entire industry of title insurance depends on this.
The willingness of lending institutions to finance the acquisition of real
estate depends on it. The financial safety of myriad numbers of owners of
real property depends on it. It is probably an understatement that the
financial health of a great portion of our economy depends on the simple
fact that anyone wishing to invest in real estate, or finance such investment,
is able to go to the proper recording officer and be assured of the posture
of the title, saving only forgery .... Into this arena of crystal clarity, the
[superlien] act introduces doubt.204
Current Issues and New Frontiers, 69 TEX. L. REV. 1369, 1379 n.41 (1991) (defining "concen-
tration risk" as "the degree to which the pool of mortgages... is geographically concentrated").
202. Cf Burkhart, supra note 28, at 281 (explaining effects of foreclosure laws on value
of mortgage securities).
The differences [in the law of foreclosure] among the states are so pronounced
that they can have a significant impact on the value of mortgage securities. For
this reason, prospectuses for mortgage securities offerings usually include a
description of the mortgage laws for the states in which the pooled mortgages
originated. The relevant state laws also significantly affect credit rating agencies'
evaluations of mortgage securities. Presumably, mortgage securities with lower
ratings will be less attractive to investors and may impede the flow of mortgage
capital to those states with more pro-borrower foreclosure laws.
Id. (footnotes omitted).
203. See Schill, Lender Liability, supra note 10, at 317 ("Idiosyncratic state laws, such as
state superlien acts, increase the risk to lenders of purchasing or originating loans in certain
states and may generate large transaction costs in the secondary mortgage market.").
204. Simon v. Oldmans Township, 497 A.2d 204, 209 (N.J. Super. Ct. Ch. Div. 1985)
(footnote omitted).
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A superlien statute thus upsets the otherwise predictable priority that resi-
dential mortgage liens enjoy. Moreover, a superlien statute represents a real
threat to residential mortgage lenders and to securitization promoters that it
may be only the first of many exceptions to that predictability. To the extent
that securitization promoters view superlien statutes in such a light, the statutes
present a threat and added cost beyond the actual economic cost that the
statutes currently pose.
If securitization promoters determine that they cannot include mortgages
from states with laws that create a substantially greater risk to mortgage lend-
ers, such as superlien statutes, then the promoters may decide simply to refuse
to purchase mortgages that originate in those jurisdictions. Indeed, that option
is exactly. what FNMA and FHLMC chose in Massachusetts in the mid-
1980s.205
Such a decision will impact the cost of residential mortgages in the states
in which securitization no longer takes place (or takes place with substantially
less frequency). Recall that one would expect the enactment of a superlien
statute to result in higher interest rates and in fewer mortgages in a state, even
in the absence of the securitization market. If, indeed, the enactment of a
superlien statute does affect the availability of securitization in a state, then
those effects will be even more pronounced. This result is because the result-
ing upward shift in the state mortgage lending industry supply curve (as Fig-
ure 2 reflects) will be greater than previously described, as the supply curve
will shift upward both because of (1) the effect of the superlien statute alone
on the traditional mortgage lender-borrower scenario, and because of (2) the
resulting effect on the availability of securitization. In effect, some or all of
the downward shift in the supply curve that is reflected in Figure 2 no longer
will inure to residents of the state. In other words, assuming that the superlien
statute renders securitization wholly unavailable, the shift in the supply curve
will not be only from S, to S2 as Figure 2 reflects, but from So to S2 as Figure
3 reflects. Thus, the interest rate lenders charge will increase not from p, to
P2, but from Po to P2, which may amount to as much as an additional 30 basis
point increase due to the unavailability of securitization in a state. 6 Also, the
number of mortgages will decrease not from q, to q2, but from q0 to q2. These
changes are the real and substantial costs that a superlien statute applicable to
residential properties can impose on a state. These costs become substantial
only because the securitization market effectively magnifies their impact.
205. See supra text accompanying notes 5-10 (describing how FNMA and FHLMC in
Massachusetts stopped buying residential multi-family housing mortgages and threatened to
stop buying single-family housing mortgages until Massachusetts amended its newly-passed
superlien statutes to exempt residential property mortgages).
206. See supra note 60 and accompanying text (noting that integration of real estate capital
markets with general capital markets reduced home mortgage loan interest rates by fifteen to
thirty basis points).
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Figure 3: Demand curve and supply curves for mortgage loans. S, is the
supply curve before enactment of a superlien statute without securitizations
available, So is the supply curve before enactment of a superlien statute with
securitizations available, andS2 is the supply curve after enactment ofa super-









VI. Commercial Mortgage Lending and Superliens
While in this Article I have generally focused on the effects of superlien
statutes on residential mortgage lending, a few words about the impact of such
statutes on commercial mortgage lending are in order.
First, Klaas van 't Veld, Gordon Rausser, and Leo Simon argue that, in
the context of commercial lending, superlien statutes actually may reduce
mones states recover for environmental cleanups and, as such, constitute poor
public policy."1  These economists explain that two factors encourage a
company's decision to issue secured debt (as opposed to unsecured debt).
First, financing a project through secured debt allows a firm to shift risk (in
the event the project fails and bankruptcy results) to "non-adjusting" creditors,
207. See Klass van 't Veld et al., Fitting the Olass Slipper: Optimal Capital Structure in
the Face of Liability (Oct 2000) (unpublished manuscript, on file with University of Michigan
Department of Economics). Their arguments do not readily translate to the context of residen-
tial mortgage lending. See supra text accompanying note 80 (noting that state will not likely
recover much since environmental cleanup costs are large and property owners are often
insolvent).
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the size of whose claims will not vary if bankruptcy results (such as the state
for recoupment of environmental cleanup expenses). 208 Second, a firm may
offer to secure a debt as an incentive for a creditor to lend money (in particu-
lar, for enough money to satisfy the needs of the firm).2"
Van 't Veld, Rausser, and Simon assert that enactment of a superlien
statute decreases the attractiveness of the first reason that firms offer secured
debt because as it increases the priority of some non-adjusting claims and thus
reduces the ability of firms to minimize non-adjusting claims.210 They argue
that this effect may shrink the range of projects that firms will undertake to
below the socially-optimal level.21' They further assert that, if the projects
that the firms no longer undertake are ones that would have proven to be
especially successful, then less money may be available to pay creditors,
including the state; thus, the state may find, perversely, that it is "paying more
cleanups out of public funds. 2 12 Van 't Veld, Rausser, and Simon recom-
mend, as an alternative to a superlien statute that grants the state's lien super-
priority status over all of a firm's assets, a statute that gives superpriority to
the state only for secured liens that arise in connection with the particular
project that gave rise to the environmental contamination.213
Assuming that superlien statutes constitute good public policy in the
commercial lending setting (or at least that they can do so if crafted correctly),
the question of whether these statutes are economically compatible with
commercial lending and securitization practices remains. In this regard, the
fact that commercial mortgage lending and securitizations have coexisted with
superlien statutes in eight states 214 is important. By contrast, six of the eight
states that feature superlien statutes have some form of residential property
208. See van 't Veld et al., supra note 207, at 1. The authors list the following as examples
of non-adjusting claims:
(1) liability claims on the firm, which are generally determined by the courts without
taking into account possible subordination of the claims in bankruptcy, (2) claims for
environmental damages, tax claims, and other government claims, which are generally
fixed by law, and (3) claims by various creditors that are simply too small to make
adjustments worthwhile, given the transaction costs involved.
Id.
209. van 't Veld et al., supra note 207, at 1-2.
210. See id. at25-28.
211. See id. at 28. However, the authors emphasize that this result need not obtain;
whether it will depends upon the particular circumstances. Id.
212. Id. (emphasis in original); see also McMahon, supra note 172, at 10,369 ("[Llender
liability schemes tend to devalue the property, the asset. As a result, loans become scarcer and
smaller. In the end, there is less money available in that business for - among other things -
the cleanup.").
213. See van 't Veld et al., supra note 207, at 28-30.
214. See supra Table 1.
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exemption, and the remaining two substantially circumscribe the scope of the
statutes as to residential property.21 ' From this common feature, one can infer
that opposition to superliens in the commercial lending context has been either
(1) far less great, (2) far less successful, or most likely, (3) some combination
of both. Several reasons exist for this conclusion.
First, the structure and actors in the residential and commercial secondary
mortgage markets differ substantially. Unlike the presences of Fannie Mae,
Freddie Mac, and Ginnie Mae in the secondary residential mortgage market,
no national - let alone quasi-governmental - entity exists that plays a corre-
sponding role in the secondary market for commercial mortgages." 6 The
Massachusetts experience clearly demonstrates the power behind having such
an institution object to particular legislation that that institution views -
correctly or incorrectly - as a threat to its function.2" Nor are these institu-
tions' governmental ties irrelevant in this regard. State legislators are likely
to think twice before running afoul of an agency or of a corporation with ties
to the federal government, for fear that the agency or corporation might
prevail on Congress to preempt the state legislatures' prerogative in the field
entirely.21 In the commercial setting, by contrast, state legislators are free
from such concerns. Thus, the pressure for uniformity is far less.
215. See supra notes 139-43 and accompanying text.
216. See supra text accompanying notes 62-63 (noting that Fannie Mae, Freddie Mac, and
Ginnie Mae have no analogy in commercial mortgage context). Cf Marilyn R. Seymann,
Banking'sRole in EmergingSecondary Markets, 47 CONSumER FIN. L.Q. REP. 253,255 (1993)
("In the post-FIRREA credit crunch, Congress is now investigating the merits of a commercial
mortgage market. Realtors and developers are lobbying heavily for the creation of a Fannie
Mac-like agency to anchor the new market, a quasi-independent corporation that could borrow
from the Federal Reserve and act as the market maker for bank-created assets.").
217. See supra text accompanying notes 5-10 (describing how Freddie Mac suspended its
buying of multi-family residential mortgages after Massachusetts adopted superlien statute, in
effect forcing Massachusetts legislature to amend statute to exempt residential mortgages).
218. Although federal government corporations (FOCs) in which the government owns
stock may not expend funds to lobby Congress or make campaign contributions, that prohibition
does not apply to FOCs, such as Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac, in which the government owns
no stock. Froomkin, supra note 60, at 598. This exception gives the latter variety of FOC "a
potential source of leverage over Congress." Id. Michael Froomkin provides the following
episode involving Fannie Mae as an example of this leverage:
[W]hen the Reagan administration indicated that it was considering making
Fannie Mae fully independent, Fannie Mae established a political action commit-
tee to oppose the Reagan administration initiatives. It also took out more than
$100,000 worth of newspaper advertisements to "raise housing as an issue in this
election year." Fannie Mae's chairman reportedly told congressmen that if they
severed Fannie Mac's links to the government, he would make sure that they had




Second, the existence of greater variations among residential mortgages
as compared to commercial mortgages also decreases the pressure for unifor-
mity. In particular, as I argue above, the general existing uniformity among
residential mortgages both within states and across state lines greatly height-
ens the impact of superlien statutes on the ability of promoters to securitize
residential loans originating in states with such statutes.219 Compared to
residential mortgages, commercial mortgages historically have featured, and
continue to feature, much more diversity. Any two commercial mortgages
may have significant differences. Those differences, moreover, generally do
not arise because of variations in commercial mortgage practices or due to
laws across state lines; rather, the particular circumstances of the transaction,
mortgagor, and mortgagee will determine the terms of a commercial mortgage.
These circumstances may change, however. First, even in the absence
of a national corporation that promotes commercial mortgage securitizations,
the growth of a secondary market in commercial mortgages has begun to
increase pressure on commercial lenders to make the terms of commercial
mortgages more uniform. ° Increased pressure on commercial lenders in turn
increases the pressure on legislatures to minimize variations in state laws that
affect commercial lenders' rights, such as superlien statutes. Moreover, in the
early 1990s, the federal government began to issue commercial mortgage-
backed securities through the Resolution Trust Corporation (RTC). 22' Al-
though the number of commercial mortgages included in RTC's securiti-
zations is comparatively low,' still "[tihe methods RTC created to securitize
these mortgages have provided a more uniform national structure for the
secondary market to securitize commercial mortgages."'
219. See supra text accompanying notes 205-06 (noting that securitization promoters may
decide to refuse to purchase mortgages from states with superlien statutes, rather than accepting
additional risk).
220. See Schill, The Impact of the Capital Markets, supra note 37, at 284 ("[Rligidity over
[mortgage] terms is... beginning to find its way into commercial mortgages. More often the
requirements of the rating agencies are dictating the form and content of commercial mort-
gages.").
221. See Burkhart supra note 28, at 276 (noting that RTC, in order to dispose of large
number of mortgages from failed thrift institutions, issued mortgage-backed securities, which
further accelerated commercial mortgage securities market); Poindexter, supra note 61, at 528-
29 (noting that "RTC created market acceptability of commercial real estate securitization,"
which allows for potentially more efficient debt servicing); Peter F. Culver, The Dawning of
Securitization, 8 PROB. & PROP., 34,37 (1994) (noting that timely disposal of mortgages from
savings loan crisis required RTC to combine commercial mortgage loans into large pools and
to issue interest in cashflow from mortgages to investors).
222. See Burkhart, upra note 28, at 276 (stating that "commercial mortgage-backed seou-
rities were issued for less than five and one-half percent of total outstanding commercial mort-
gage debt in 1994").
223. Id. (footnote omitted). Accord Seymann, supra note 216, at 255 ("[Ihe RTC's
liquidation efforts have set the foundation for a stronger, more widespread secondary market
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Second, although the number of residential loans subject to state super-
lien laws is likely to be small in the context of mortgage pools,224 the insignifi-
cance of a singe mortgage is not as likely with commercial mortgages. This
difference results from the fact that "the number of loans in a commercial
mortgage-backed security pool is much smaller and [so] any one loan is likely
to have a far greater impact.o225 As a result, loans from states with statutes
that veer from the norm - such as superlien statutes - may pose a larger
barrier to securitization in the commercial setting than they do in the residen-
tial setting. Thus, as Michael Schill concludes, the forces that challenge the
continued existence of variable state laws affecting commercial lenders' rights
"are probably stronger today than at any time in our past."226
In light of this conclusion, one might expect the pressure.for national uni-
formity to grow as the commercial mortgage securitization continues to ex-
pand. This pressure, as it builds, should overtake the pressure for uniformity
in the context of residential mortgage lending because the structure of commer-
cial mortgage lending allows superlien statutes applicable to commercial prop-
erty to greater frustratb securitization of loans than their residential counter-
parts. In particular, the comparatively large size of commercial mortgage loans
makes loans with differentiations that much more difficult to isolate in a
diversified mortgage pool that generally does not feature such differentiations.
VII. Superliens and the Debate over Uniformity of Laws
In this Article, I argue that the national securitization markets and their
demand for greater uniformity in the laws governing lien preferences magni-
fies and makes substantial the costs of superlien statutes. As such, the pres-
sure to eliminate and to restrict state superlien laws is analogous to the general
pressure to eliminate state variations in the laws governing real estate nation-
wide.227 These efforts have taken the forms of federal legislative proposals
for commercial real estate debt."); Culver, supra note 221, at 37 (suggesting that consortium of
National Association of Realtors, Mortgage Bankers Association of America, and National
Realty Committee has also spurred development of more uniform structure).
224. See supra note 200 and accompanying text (noting that ignoring heightened risk in
loans from states with superlien statutes is plausible only if number of such loans is insignifi-
cant, which is the case).
225. Schill, The Impact of the CapitalMarkets, supra note 37, at 287. Another factor that
increases the likely magnitude of commercial loans subject to superlien statutes is that the
number of states with superlien statutes applicable to commercial real estate is four times larger
than the number with statutes applicable to residential real estate. See supra text accompanying
note 133 (noting that supedien statutes in six out of eight states exempt residential property).
226. Schill, The Impact of the Capital Markets, supra note 37, at 288.
227. See generally Schill, The Impact of the Capital Markets, supra note 37 (describing
and predicting effects of growth of real estate capital markets); Schill, Uniformity or Diversity,
supra note 39 (examining "normative case for replacing diverse state real estate finance laws
with a uniform national law"); Symposium, Whatever Happened to the Uniform Land Transac-
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and enactments to preempt state law228 and of attempts to induce state legisla-
tures to enact uniform laws.229 Commentators observe that economic forces
drive these efforts,"3 which have had mixed success.31 In short, the argument
for uniform laws "is one of competitive advantage for available capital." 2
Lenders and securitization conduits have called to curtail state laws that afford
their residents rights not available to residents of other states in order to
reduce the transaction costs and protect the viability of a national market.
The similarity that the debate over state superlien laws bears to the
deliberation over nationalizing real estate laws stands in stark contrast to the
dissimilarity between the superlien debate and a current discussion in the
environmental academic literature over the proper allocation of environmental
regulatory authority between the federal government and the states. 233 This
tionsAct, 20 NOVA L. Rv. 1017 (1996) [hereinafter ULTA Symposium] (examining, in depth,
Uniform Land Transactions Act to illuminate why no state ever adopted it).
228. See Schill, Uniformity or Diversity, supra note 39, at 1280-86 (describing federal
courts' rejection of state mortgage foreclosure laws when federal government is mortgagee).
229. See Patrick A. Randolph, Jr., The Future of American Real Estate Law: Uniform
Foreclosure Laws and Uniform Land Security Interest Act, 20 NOVA L. REV. 1017 (1996)
(noting that Congress might preempt state legislation if states with judicial sale foreclosure
practices do not adopt Uniform Land Security Interest Act); ULTA Symposium, supra note 227
(addressing fate of Uniform Land Transactions Act).
230. See Burkhart, supra note 28, at 281-84 (noting that federal government has "demon-
strated its willingness to preempt state mortgage lending laws," and that this willingness may
arise from the failure of "past attempts to achieve voluntary national uniformity by the states");
Randolph, supra note 229, at 1111-12 (noting that specialized state real estate laws have
spawned social conditions that make laws resistant to change, which is why "development in
this area is slower than in the areas regulated by the UCC"); Schill, The Impact of the Capital
Markets, supra note 37, at 285 (noting that "the track record among states in voluntarily
adopting the uniform laws promulgated by the National Commissioners on Uniform Laws has
been dismal," but that federal government has successfully imposed uniform laws on states in
certain instances). On efforts to have the states enact uniform laws, see generally Edward J.
Janger, Predicting Khen the Uniform Law Process Will Fail: Article 9, Capture, and the Race
to the Bottom, 83 IowA L. REV. 569 (1998).
231. See Randolph, supra note 229, at 1111 (noting that greatest argument for uniformity
is economic efficiency - nonuniformity in state laws creates unpredictability in performance of
real estate investments, resulting in disincentive for lenders to invest); Schill, The Impact of the
Capital Markets, supra note 37, at 285 (noting that higher costs of interstate real estate
transactions create incentive for eliminating differences in states' laws).
232. Randolph, supra note 229, at 1111.
233. Compare John P. Dwyer, The Practice of Federalism Under the Clean Air Act, 54
MD. L. REV. 1183, 1219-24 (1995) (explaining "dramatic growth of state environmental
regulation over the last twenty-five years"); Richard L. Revesz, Rehabilitating Interstate
Competition: Rethinking the "Race-to-the-Bottom"Rationalefor Federal EnvironmentalRegu-
lation, 67 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1210 (1992) (arguing that federal regulation is not appropriate
response to state "race to bottom" over environmental standards); and Richard L. Revesz, The
Race to the Bottom and Federal Environmental Regulation: A Response to Critics, 82 MINN.
L. REv. 535 (1997) [hereinafter Revesz, A Response] (advocating rebuttable presumption in
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debate has centered largely on the validity of one of the primary justifications
that supporters of federal environmental regulation offer - that the states, left
to their own devices, will embark on a race-to-the-bottom that will result in
suboptimal protection of the environment. The superlien debate differs from
the paradigm of race-to-the-bottom supporters in that, in the context of the
superlien, the states that enact such statutes provide greater environmental
protection than other states.
Table 7 presents the taxonomy of support for uniform environmental
regulation in the context of the ongoing academic debate and in the context
of superlien statutes. The table sets forth the following in each context:
(1) which group tends to support enactment of uniform law, (2) the state
action of which supporters of uniform law complain, (3) the supporters'
suggested response, and (4) the justification underlying that response.
Table 7- Taxonomy of Opposition to State Environmental Regulations
Standard Debate over
Uniformity of Environ- Debate over Superliens
mental Regulation
Identity of
Supporters of Environmentalists Lenders and
Uniform Securitization Conduits
Law:
Enacting Laws that Provide Enacting Superlien Statutes
State Action: Too Little Protection for the that Provide Greater
Environment Environmental Protection
Suggested Uniform Federal Floor for Uniform Ceiling for
Response: Environmental Regulation Regulation
Prevent a "Race-to-the- Protection of National
Bottom" Market for Securitizations
favor of state regulation of environment), with Kirsten H. Engel, State Environmental Standard-
Setting: Is There a "Race" and Is It 'To the Bottom"?, 48 HAsTiNaS L.J. 271 (1997) (arguing
for federal minimum environmental standards and federal inducements to state cooperation in
environmental standard-setting), Daniel C. Esty, Revitalizing Environmental Federalism, 95
MICH L. REV. 570 (1996) (arguing for multi-tier environmental regulatory structure), and
Joshua D. Sarnoff, The Continuing Imperative (But Only from a National Perspective) for Fed-
eral Environmental Regulation, 7 DUKE ENVTL. L. & POL'Y F. 225 (1997) (arguing for federal
environmental regulation). See generally Daniel C. Esty, Toward Optimal Environmental
Governance, 74 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1495 (1999) (suggesting changes in current environmental
policy efforts that would lead toward optimal multi-tiered environmental governance).
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Before I analyze the merits of the argument for uniformity in the context
of superlien statues, I note that the taxonomy that Table 7 demonstrates is
somewhat problematic for race-to-the-bottom adherents. In particular, the
superlien statute debates provide an example where some states have not
engaged in such a race, but instead have tried to provide greater environmental
protection than their neighbors. Moreover, the pressure for uniformity is not
for a uniform floor for environmental protection, but rather for an effective
uniform ceiling to cap the states' effort in this regard. At the same time, race-
to-the-bottom adherents could point also to the debate over state superliens
and could argue that the success of lenders and securitization conduits in
halting the proliferation of superlien statutes is indicative of the same forces
that generally drive the rae-to-the-bottom.
Turning to the merits of the argument for a uniform law that restricts
state superlien statutes, Richard Revesz posits three reasons in favor of a
general presumption of decentralization of environmental regulation. 234 First,
the question of whether a community wishes to invest in increased environ-
mental protection is one of resource allocation. As Revesz explains, "we can
generally purchase additional environmental protection at some price, paid in
the currency ofjobs, wages, shareholders' profits, tax revenues, and economic
growth." 5 Given the large size and diversity of the United States, 6 different
regions reasonably would have different aggregate preferences as to how
much environmental protection to purchase. 7 Different regions also may
rank other interests higher and therefore think that it is appropriate to devote
more resources to those causes. Indeed, this logic is borne out by empirical
evidence and supported by political theory?s
Revesz's second reason that favors a presumption of decentralization is
that the benefits that certain measures of environmental protection offer in fact
vary throughout the country. 9 As Revesz explains: "For example, a strin-
gent ambient standard may benefit many people in densely populated areas
but only a few elsewhere. Similarly, a particular level of exposure to a con-
taminant may be more detrimental if it is combined with exposure to other
contaminants with which it has synergistic effects."'24
234. See Revesz, A Response, supra note 233, at 536-37 (providing justifications for rebut-
table presumption of decentralization).
235. Id. at 536.
236. See Schill, Uniformity or Diversity, supra note 39, at 1300-01 (noting meaningful
differences among states and among states' economies).
237. See Revesz, A Response, supra note 233, at 536 (noting that regulators should not
disregard different preferences of citizens of different regions of country).
238. See Schill, Uniformity or Diverity, supra note 39, at 1301-04 (showing documented
connections between state culture and state law).
239. Revesz,A Response, supra note 233, at 536.
240. Id. at 536-37.
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Third, the costs of meeting a given environmental standard also vary
throughout the country.241 Revesz elucidates as follows:
For example, a source may have a large detrimental impact on ambient air
quality if it is directly upwind from a mountain or other topographical
barrier. Similarly, a water polluter will have a far larger impact on water
quality standards if it disposes its effluents in relatively small bodies of
water. Climate might also play a role: certain emission or effluent stan-
dards may be easier (and cheaper) to meet in warmer weather.242
Of these factors, the last - the cost of compliance - seems less likely to
vary in the case of cleanups of hazardous waste sites than with other forms of
pollution. However, the particular topography and chemical makeup of a
contaminated site surely can affect the cost of cleanup and accordingly can
affect the likelihood that a superlien statute might apply.
The second factor - the benefits of more frequent environmental clean-
ups - indeed can vary across regions. For example, greater numbers of
environmentally-contaminated sites are more likely to concern a more densely
populated state. By contrast, a sparsely populated state may be more content
to allow contaminated sites in uninhabited areas to remain untreated.
2 43
The first factor - variations in priorities and preferences across state and
regional lines - resonates especially loudly in the context of superlien legisla-
tion. Residents in one region might value environmental quality quite highly
and be willing to pay, among other things, higher rates of interest to attain a
higher level of it. Also residents in another region - in particular, in a region
with comparatively lower average incomes or in a region that highly values
home ownership - might be willing to sacrifice some marginal amount of
environmental quality in exchange for lower home mortgage interest rates.
Indeed, Michael Schill bases his conclusion that scholars have not convinc-
ingly established the case for uniform real estate laws as a policy matter in
large measure on the existence of regional variations in preferences. 2"
241. Id. at 537.
242. Id.
243. Cf. James T. Hamilton & W. Kip Viscusi, The Benefits and Costs of Regulatory
Reforms for Superfund, 16 STAN. ENVTL. L.J. 159 (1997) (arguing in favor of determining
appropriate Superfund remediation strategies based upon cost-benefit analysis of sites that
would focus on health risk continued contamination would pose to current residents); James T.
Hamilton & W. Kip Viscusi, Human Health RiskAssessmentsfor Superfund, 21 ECOLOGY L.Q.
573 (1994) (critiquing EPA's policy of requiring cleanup of Superfund sites based on all
possible future uses of sites rather than eliminating future risks by imposing land use restrictions
and containment).
244. See Schill, Uniformity or Diversity, supra note 39, at 1302-04 (noting that "real estate
values and mortgage defaults are more closely tied to local than to national conditions").
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Revesz argues in favor of a presumption that rests environmental regula-
tion with more local governmnents.245 Understandable regional variations in
the importance of environmental quality, the expense of achieving it,24' and
in home ownership underscore the applicability of that presumption in the
context of state superlien regulation. Moreover, two standard justifications
for uniform federal environmental regulation - the dangers of a race-to-the-
bottom situation and of interstate environmental externalities - are absent
here.
The question arises whether securitization's preference for uniformity
might justify overcoming this presumption. I describe above how securitiza-
tion magnifies the costs associated with superlien statutes.247 It appears that
states have determined, in the face of pressure from Fannie Mae and Freddie
Mac, that these heightened costs outweigh the benefits of superlien statutes
in the context of residential mortgage lending.
Pressure to restrict and to eliminate superlien statutes in the context of
commercial mortgage lending is likely to increase, perhaps beyond the level
of pressure to eliminate them in the residential context, as commercial mort-
gage securitizations continue to expand.24' However, it is also true that com-
mercial properties are much more likely to become environmentally contami-
nated and therefore to require environmental cleanup.249 Therefore, applica-
tion of superlien statutes to the commercial, as opposed to the residential,
mortgage lending context is more likely to serve the primary goal underlying
superlien statutes - greater environmental quality at less cost to the govern-
ment. Accordingly, I cannot conclude that the presumption in favor of vesting
environmental regulatory authority more in state and local governments
necessarily can be overcome in the context of commercial mortgage lending.
VI. Conclusion
In this Article, I have analyzed the arguments for and against superlien
statutes that are applicable to residential properties. I explained, but did not
quantify, the likely benefits of such statutes. I also analyzed the costs of these
statutes and argued that those costs, in the absence of securitization and of
secondary mortgage markets, are not great. By contrast, securitization magni-
245. See Revesz, A Response, supra note 233 (arguing for presumption of decentralization
of environmental regulation).
246. See Rabe, supra note I (describing extent and diversity of challenges to environmen-
tal quality in New Jersey).
247. See supra Part V.D.
248. See supra notes 220-26 and accompanying text (explaining why pressures for uni-
formity are increasing in the commercial mortgage context).
249. See supra Part VI.B (arguing that activities at residential sites are exceedingly un-
likely to cause environmental contamination).
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fies the costs of these statutes because it places a high premium on uniformity
of state law. Superlien statutes introduce a nonuniformity in state law which,
in the context of residential mortgage lending, tends to undermine the predict-
ability of lien priority upon which the residential mortgage lending and, by
extension, securitization industries rely.
As opposed to superlien statutes applicable to residential properties -
which are few in number and greatly circumscribed as an apparent result of
opposition by lenders and securitization promoters - superlien statutes appli-
cable to commercial properties are more numerous and better established.
This difference is due to the relatively slow development of secondary mar-
kets in commercial mortgage loans. Now that the commercial mortgage
secondary market is expanding at a fast pace, it is reasonable to expect the
opposition of lenders and securitization promoters to superlien statutes to in-
crease. That opposition one day might exceed opposition to superlien statutes
in the residential context insofar as commercial mortgage loans tend to be
much larger than their residential counterparts, making it harder for commer-
cial loan securitization promoters to include commercial loans from states
with superlien statutes as small pieces of large, diverse mortgage pools.
Superlien statutes are an example of a type of state law that affords resi-
dents of a state greater protection (here, specifically, greater environmental
protection) but that goes against the demands of a developing national market-
place. In this sense, the battle over superlien statutes is typical of efforts to
make real estate laws more uniform - market pressures seek to impose a
national ceiling on state regulation. By contrast, this discussion differs from
the typical setting in which academics debate which level of government
should promulgate environmental regulation. There, a standard justification
for federal environmental regulation is that states, left to their own devices,
would respond to economic pressures and engage in a race to the bottom in
environmental regulation. Advocates for federal intervention argue that the
possibility of such a race makes appropriate the federal government's setting
a national floor on state regulation. The debate over superlien statutes poses
an important counterexample to these scholars' arguments, insofar as states
in fact have tried to resist market forces and to set higher environmental
standards. I argued here that the economic pressure of the securitization
industry is not sufficient justification to preempt states from enacting super-
lien statutes applicable to commercial properties. State decision-makers
rationally might conclude that the benefits of a superlien statute outweigh its
costs in their state.
